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I. INTRODUCTION
Digitalization has transformed everyday life. Routine functions are
performed by using assorted digital applications and the online consumer is at
the center of modern business models. Many of the world’s largest companies
are highly digitalized, including Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and
Microsoft. The digital economy offers great benefits to society, yet its unique
attributes have produced considerable tax challenges. This is primarily because
highly digitalized business models often do not conform with traditional
international tax characterizations. Most notably, highly digitalized businesses
can earn profits in foreign economies without creating physical permanent
establishments that give rise to taxing rights. As a result, significant profits
remain untaxed by market jurisdictions despite the sustained involvement of
highly digitalized enterprises in those market jurisdictions. International efforts
are underway to address the tax challenges arising from digitalization. The
OECD is working through an inclusive framework comprised of 137 countries,
large and small, to achieve a long-term consensus-based solution on new taxing
rights and profit allocation norms.1 Meanwhile, as of January 2021
approximately 38 jurisdictions have announced, proposed, or already adopted
unilateral measures to tax revenues from digital services provided within their
jurisdictions.2
This Article comprehensively analyzes the tax challenges arising from
digitalization and the measures proposed to address them. First, the Article
describes the distinct features of the digital economy and the tax challenges they
present. These issues are posed by digital-tech giants that take advantage of base
erosion and profit shifting mechanisms to transfer profits from high-tax to low-
tax jurisdictions. Second, the Article evaluates the leading measures aimed at
revising the international tax framework. These include the OECD’s Pillar One,
unilateral digital services taxes, and a U.N. proposal. The Article then analyzes
some of the most current developments in the digital tax debate. This includes
the U.S.-France dispute over France’s Digital Tax Bill, and the future of
international tax reform during the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, the Article
1. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an
intergovernmental economic organization comprising 37Member States. TheOECDwas founded in 1961
to stimulate economic progress and world trade. For more information and a complete list of OECD
Member States, see About: Our Global Reach, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-
partners; for a complete list of the 137 Member States of the Inclusive Framework on BEPS, see OECD,
Members of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS (Dec. 2019), https://www.oecd.org/tax/
beps/inclusive-framework-on-beps-composition.pdf.
2. Taxation of the Digitalized Economy: Developments Summary, at 5, KPMG (Jan. 15, 2021),
https://tax.kpmg.us/content/dam/tax/en/pdfs/2020/digitalized-economy-taxation-developments-summary
.pdf [hereinafter KPMGSummary]. The KPMG summary is updated from time to time. The data provided
hereinafter is current as of information posted on January 15, 2021.
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argues in favor of a multilateral solution, implemented on an OECD-level. This
Article proposes applying the new nexus based on market thresholds and subject
to a global de minimis amount, that is not dependent on physical presence. This
Article advises against global revenue thresholds that discriminate against U.S.-
based companies and which do not reflect economic involvement in market
jurisdictions.
II. DIGITAL ECONOMY
A. A Digital Transformation
Digitalization is reinventing business models in all industries and changing
the way companies engage with consumers around the world.3 The extensive use
of computers and smartphones is a prime example of the transition to a digital
world, demonstrated by the prominent consumption of social media, online
marketplaces, streaming services, internet advertisements, and the like. Despite
the remarkable prevalence of digital technology, the process of “digitalization,”
or the concept of a “digital economy” remain terms that lack a commonly
understood definition.
“Digitalization” or “digital transformation” refer to systems and effects on
economic activity set forth by encoding of information into binary bits that can
be interpreted by computers.4 According to a 2015 OECD report, “the digital
economy is the result of a transformative process generated by information and
communication technology.”5 Businesses operating in the digital economy
engage with user data (e.g. placement of advertising), services connecting users
to each other (e.g. online sharing platforms and marketplaces), and other digital
services (e.g. streaming services).6 As noted by the OECD, drawing lines
between what is digital and what is not can be a daunting task, “because the
digital economy is increasingly becoming the economy itself.”7 This is
particularly evident during the COVID-19 crisis in which even tangible business
activity has increasingly shifted online, and classifying the digital economy
becomes more difficult.8
Notwithstanding some definitional ambiguities, digital technology has
rapidly integrated intelligent data into everything we do, and online platforms
3. David Reinsel, John Gantz & John Rydning, The Digitization of the World from Edge to
Core, at 2, INT’L DATA CORPORATION (Nov. 2018), https://www.seagate.com/files/www-content/our-
story/trends/files/idc-seagate-dataage-whitepaper.pdf.
4. Id.
5. OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, Action 1: 2015 Final
Report, at 142 (2015), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264241046-en.pdf?expires=161064
4133&id=id&accname=ocid177224&checksum=2B8F496D6A3DD68A486D16D678466C95.
6. European Commission, Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Common
System of a Digital Services Tax on Revenues Resulting from the Provision of Certain Digital Services, at
13-20, COM (2018) 148 final (Mar. 21, 2018).
7. OECD, supra note 5, at 54.
8. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Statement by Mr. Mukhisa Kituyi,
Secretary-General of UNCTAD on Covid-19 and the Digital Economy (Apr. 6, 2020) (stating that “there
has been a shift to electronic commerce over physical retail and service provision”).
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are increasingly powerful in the world economy.9 In 2017, the combined value
of digital platform companies10 with market capitalization exceeding $100
million was estimated to be over $7 trillion, a 67% increase from 2015.11 Digital
platforms and services have obtained momentous market positions: Google, for
example, accounts for 90% of internet searches,12 while Facebook accounts for
two-thirds of the world’s social media market, and is the top social media
platform in over 90% of the world’s economies.13 By 2019, online retail-giant
Amazon accounted for almost 40% of the world’s online retail activity.14 The
drastic increase in online usage and data demonstrates the growth of the digital
economy. In 2019, there were 4.39 billion internet users (an increase of 9% from
2018), 5.11 billion unique mobile users, and 3.48 billion social media users.15
In, 2018, 95% of businesses in the OECD operated with a high-speed internet
connection. The global volume of online data is expected to grow from a total of
33 zettabytes in 2018 to 175 zettabytes by 2025.16 The value of the digital
economy on a global scale is estimated to be between 4.5% to 15.5% of the
world’s GDP.17
The digital economy is not governed by a traditional “North-South,” “East-
West,” or “developed-developing” divide.18 Instead, two countries—the U.S.
and China—and a handful of digital platforms therefrom dominate the digital
world. In 2019, the U.S. and China accounted for 90% of the market capital value
of the world’s 70 largest digital platforms.19 In comparison, the entire share of
Europe was 4%, and Latin America and Africa together accounted for only 1%.20
The U.S.-based Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, Google and Facebook, along with
the China-based Tencent and Alibaba, comprise two thirds of this total market
capitalization value.21 In July 2020, the world’s five largest companies bymarket
capitalization were the aforementioned Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, Alphabet
(Google), and Facebook, in relevant order.22 These companies alone have a
market capitalization of over $6 trillion, and in 2019 reported over $800 billion
9. Reinsel, Gantz & Rydning, supra note 3, at 2.
10. Digital platform companies provide value by enabling connection, information, and data
sharing by and between users. Examples include Amazon, eBay, and Alibaba.
11. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development,Digital Economy Report 2019 Value Creation
and Capture: Implications for Developing Countries, at xvii, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DER/2019 (2019)




15. Simon Kemp, Digital 2019: A Global Digital Overview, DATAREPORTAL (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2019-global-digital-overview.
16. A zettabyte is equivalent to one trillion gigabytes. See Reinsel, Gantz & Rydning, supra
note 3, at 3.
17. This range depends on the classification of the “digital economy.” See UNCTAD 2019
Report, supra note 11, at xvi.




22. Followed immediately by Tencent and Alibaba. See Stock Screener, NASDAQ (last
accessed July 2020), https://www.nasdaq.com/market-activity/stocks/screener?exchange=NASDAQ&
sortname=marketcap&sorttype=1 [hereinafter NASDAQ Stock Screener].
2021] Taxation of the Digital Economy 61
of revenues while earning over $150 billion of profits.23 Apple and Alphabet are
also among the world’s ten most profitable companies.24
B. Principles of International Taxation
To understand the challenges posed by digitalization, consider some
fundamental principles of international taxation. The international tax
framework is founded on a broad network of bilateral income tax treaties.25
These include three notable model conventions, with which bilateral treaties
generally conform: the OECDModel Tax Convention on Income and on Capital,
the U.N. Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and
Developing Countries, and the U.S. Model Income Tax Convention.26 Most tax
treaties adhere to the OECD Model Tax Convention.27 Income tax treaties
determine when a resident enterprise of one State maintains sufficient connection
to another State to justify levying taxation by the latter State.28 Under Article 5
of the OECDModel Tax Convention,29 this connection exists when an enterprise
resident in one State (the residence State) has a permanent establishment (PE) in
another State (the source State).30 A PE is a “fixed place of business” through
which an enterprise wholly or partly carries out its business.31 This can include
a place of management, branch, office, factory, workshop, or place of extraction
of natural resources.32 The PE threshold can also be satisfied if a dependent agent
of the foreign enterprise acts on its behalf and habitually exercises authority to
conclude contracts in its name.33 A certain level of physical presence in the
source jurisdiction is typically required to constitute a PE. If an enterprise does
not have physical presence in the foreign jurisdiction, it does not have a PE and
thus no income tax nexus arises.34 The PE standard set forth in Article 5 of the
OECD Model Tax Convention is the international norm facilitating taxation of
non-resident enterprises.35
23. Top 100 Digital Companies 2019 Ranking, FORBES (Nov. 2019), https://www.forbes.
com/top-digital-companies/list/#tab:rank [hereinafter Forbes 2019 Ranking].
24. Id.
25. OECD, supra note 5, at 26.
26. OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 2017 (Dec.
18, 2017), https://read.oecd.org/10.1787/mtc_cond-2017-en?format=pdf [hereinafter OECD Model Tax
Convention]; U.N. Department of Economic & Social Affairs, U.N. Model Double Taxation Convention
between Developed and Developing Countries 2017 Update, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E/213 (2017);
U.S. Department of the Treasury, United States Model Income Tax Convention (2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/documents/treaty-us%20model-2016.pdf.
27. Eduardo Baistrocchi, The Use and Interpretation of Tax Treaties in the Emerging World:
Theory and Implications, 4 BRIT. TAX REV. 352, 353-354 (2008).
28. Itai Grinberg, International Taxation in an Era of Digital Disruption: Analyzing the Current
Debate, TAXES, 85, 90 (March 2019).
29. As well as in the U.N. and U.S. Model Conventions.
30. OECDModel Tax Convention, supra note 26, at art. 5; Grinberg supra note 28, at 85.
31. OECDModel Tax Convention, supra note 26, at art. 5.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Monica Gianni, OECD BEPS (In)Action 1: Factor Presence as a Solution to Tax Issues of
the Digital Economy, ,
35. Grinberg, supra note 28, at 88-90.
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Under this norm, the source country may tax business profits of an
enterprise only if the enterprise carries out a business in that country through a
PE, and those profits are attributable to that PE.36 Profits attributable to a PE are
profits that the PE would be expected to make if it were a separate and
independent enterprise engaging in the same or similar activities.37
Equipment and machinery located in a particular country may constitute a
fixed place of business and thus a PE in that country. A noteworthy distinction
is made between computer equipment which may be set up at a certain location
to constitute a PE, and the data and software used by that computer, which does
not.38 An internet website, for example, is not tangible property and does not
constitute a fixed place of business.39 The server on which that website is stored
may constitute a fixed place of business, in the physical location in which that
server is accessible through a piece of equipment.40 An enterprise is still
generally required to maintain a physical presence in the source country to be
subject to income tax liability. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) can thus avoid
having a PE by locating servers outside of a country, regardless of the volume of
digital sales into that country.41 This also enables MNEs to report profits outside
of a market jurisdiction, a common practice discussed more in detail in the
following section.
C. The Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalization
The growing digital transformation poses great international tax
challenges, as current international tax law and its principles have failed to adapt
to global business practices.42 An ever-rising digital economy increases the
difficulty of taxing highly digitalized businesses that do not conform with
traditional physical business models. The current international tax framework
was designed to accommodate a traditional “brick and mortar” economy. It has
not evolved to undertake modern business models in which physical presence in
the source jurisdiction is unnecessary.43 Nowadays, enterprises can be heavily
involved in the economic life of another country without having a fixed place of
business or a dependent agent that would constitute a PE.44 This is the practice
of highly digitalized businesses that engage in online activity and provide digital
services to consumers worldwide with no fixed place of business in the market
36. Gianni, supra note 34, at 259.
37. OECDModel Tax Convention, supra note 26, at art. 7.
38. OECD, COMMENTARIESON THEARTICLESOF THEMODELTAXCONVENTION, Commentary
on Article 5, ¶ 42.2 (2017) [hereinafter OECD COMMENTARIES].
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. According to the OECD, a server could create a PE if its functions are typically related to a
sale in which case the enterprise would be taxable on income attributable to that server PE. SeeMonica
Gianni, The OECD’S Flawed and Dated Approach to Computer Servers Creating PEs, 17 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 1, 5 (2014); OECD COMMENTARIES, supra note 38, ¶ 42.2.
42. Louise Fjord Kjarsgaard & Peter Koerver Schmidt, Allocation of the Right to Tax Income
from Digital Intermediary Platforms: Challenges and Possibilities for Taxation in the Jurisdiction of the
User, 1 NORDIC J. COM. L. 146, 148 (2018).
43. Id.
44. OECD, supra note 5, at 101.
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jurisdiction. A digital company can offer services online, thereby reaching
consumers without ever being physically present in the jurisdiction where its
consumers are located.45 Absent a PE in the market, profits from digital services
are taxed primarily in the residence country of the selling enterprise (i.e. country
of incorporation). Highly digitized MNEs can also incorporate and stash profits
in low-tax jurisdictions, while engaging in sustained commercial activity in
market countries where their profits remain untaxed.
Digital business models feature unique characteristics. They generally
operate online, and rely heavily on intangibles, customer-generated content,
mobility, automation, and the ability to engage with consumers without a
physical presence.46 Widespread examples of such activities include placement
of online advertising, use of digital (internet) intermediary platforms,47 cloud
computing, and sale of user-generated data. The challenge of taxing a highly
digitalized enterprise that does not conform with traditional physical
characterizations can be demonstrated through prominent business examples.
Consider the case of Uber Technologies, Inc., a leading digital intermediary
platform. Uber operates by linking drivers and passengers to complete rides,48
and charges a fee in exchange for providing its intermediary mediation service.
Uber, like many other highly digitalized enterprises, benefits from low taxation
of its worldwide income partly due to tax planning structures involving entities
in low-tax jurisdictions.49 For many companies like Uber, this means avoiding a
PE in market jurisdictions in which users are located. In Uber’s case, a
Netherlands subsidiary (Uber International C.V.) processes the global payments
for all rides.50 Similarly, audio streaming service Spotify maintains its
operational office in Sweden, though it is headquartered in tax-friendly
Luxembourg.51 Moreover, for many years most of Google’s and Facebook’s
European revenues were reported in Ireland subsidiaries: Google Ireland Ltd.
and Facebook Ireland Ltd., respectively.52
MNEs use several strategies to reduce their tax liability on international
income. These measures, often known as Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(BEPS), include minimizing profit taxation in a source country by avoiding
source country tax jurisdiction, shifting profits to tax havens, treaty shopping or
45. Gianni, supra note 34, at 285.
46. Id. at 270; OECD, supra note 5, at 86.
47. The OECD defines “internet intermediaries” as enterprises that “bring together or facilitate
transactions between third parties on the Internet. They give access to, host, transmit and index content,
products and services originated by third parties on the Internet or provide Internet-based services to third
parties.” Examples include Uber, Airbnb, and Amazon. See Karine Perset, The Economic and Social Role
of Internet Intermediaries, at 9, OECD Digital Economy Papers, No. 171 (Apr. 2010), https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/5kmh79zzs8vb-en.pdf?expires=1610645320&id=id&accname=guest&checksum
=7B856CF3334BA8F92A8FCE6C3FA22708.
48. Kjarsgaard & Schmidt, supra note 42, at 151-52.
49. Id. at 152.
50. Id.
51. Spotify Technology S.A., SEC Amendment No. 3 to Form F-1 Registration Statement, at 7
(2018).
52. Paul Tang & Henri Bussink, EU Tax Revenue Loss from Google and Facebook, at 3, PVDA
EUROPA (Sept. 2017), https://static.financieel-management.nl/documents/16690/EU-Tax-Revenue-Loss-
from-Google-and-Facebook.pdf.
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taking advantage of favorable treaties to minimize tax liability, and avoiding the
application of Controlled Foreign Corporation rules.53 A heavy reliance on
intangibles allows digital MNEs to avoid a physical presence in the source
country and shift profits to tax havens or low tax jurisdictions with relative
ease.54 Revenues are not necessarily reported in the countries where they were
earned, which makes it more difficult for market jurisdictions to tax them.55 This
leads to a disparity between the location of digital consumers and the location of
booked revenues.56 The result is a double-distortion to the advantage of highly
digitalized enterprises.
First, the total tax liability of global digital enterprises is lower than
similarly profitable non-digital, or “traditional” enterprises. In 2017, the
European Commission (EC)57 found that digital domestic businesses are subject
to an effective average tax rate of 8.5%, whereas traditional (physical) domestic
businesses are subject to an effective average tax rate of 20.9%. Similarly, digital
international businesses are subject to an effective tax rate of only 10.1%,
whereas traditional international businesses are subject to an effective average
tax rate of 23.2%.58 According to the EC, this tax gap exists primarily due to
digital business models which rely heavily on intangible assets and benefit from
tax incentives.59 In July 2020, the OECD released a new corporate tax statistics
report on the global tax and economic activities of nearly 4,000 MNEs
headquartered in 26 jurisdictions and operating across more than 100
jurisdictions worldwide.60 According to the OECD, there is a misalignment
between the locations where profits are reported and where economic activity
occurs.61 In investment hubs, MNEs report on average a relatively high share of
profits (25%) compared to their shares of employees (4%) and tangible assets
(11%).62 Furthermore, the predominant business activity of MNEs in investment
hubs is holding shares and other equity instruments.63 This indicates the
existence of BEPS and tax planning structures in low-tax jurisdictions, and
53. Hugh J. Ault, Some Reflections on the OECD and the Sources of International Tax
Principles, 70 TAX NOTES INT’L 1195, 1198 (June 17, 2013). Controlled Foreign Corporation rules are
designed to prevent residents from artificially deferring taxable income by using foreign entities. See 26
U.S.C. § 951A(f).
54. Jinyan Li, Protecting the Tax Base in the Digital Economy, in U.N. HANDBOOK ON
SELECTED ISSUES IN PROTECTING THE TAX BASE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 27 (June 2014).
55. UNCTAD 2019 Report, supra note 11, at 95.
56. Id.
57. The EC is the executive branch of the European Union.
58. The figures refer to effective tax rates in the EU. See European Commission,
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: A Fair and Efficient
Tax System in the European Union for the Digital Single Market, at 6, COM (2017) 547 final (Sept. 21,
2017) [hereinafter 2017 EC Communication].
59. Id.
60. OECD, CORPORATE TAX STATISTICS 33 (2nd ed., 2020).
61. Id. at 41.
62. In the OECD report, investment hubs are defined as jurisdictions with a total inward foreign
direct investment position above 150% of GDP which includes Bahamas; Barbados; Bermuda; British
Virgin Islands; Cayman Islands; Cyprus; Gibraltar; Guernsey; Hong Kong, China; Hungary; Ireland; Isle
of Man; Jersey; Liberia; Luxembourg; Malta; Marshall Islands; Mauritius; Mozambique; Netherlands;
Singapore; and Switzerland. See Id.
63. Id. at 44.
2021] Taxation of the Digital Economy 65
reinforces the need to address under-taxation and non-taxation of MNEs in a
digital world.64
A second distortion is manifested in the imbalanced allocation of taxing
rights between jurisdictions. In the present international tax framework, profits
of highly digitalized MNEs are not equitably allocated to market jurisdictions
where commercial activity occurs. This can be demonstrated by examining the
reported earnings of Facebook Inc. and Alphabet Inc. (Google). In 2017,
Facebook earned 56% of its revenues and 66% of its profits outside the U.S.65
Facebook, however, paid only 8% of its taxes to countries outside the U.S.,
according to the company’s 2017 annual report.66 Similarly, in 2017 Google
earned 53% of its revenues and 61% of its profits outside the U.S.,67 yet paid
only 12% of its taxes to foreign countries, according to the company’s 2017
annual report.68
The lengthy operation of Google and Facebook in Ireland illustrates the
ability of highly digitalized MNEs to shift profits to low-tax countries, thereby
decreasing their total tax liability. In 2015, the vast majority of Google’s and
Facebook’s European revenues were booked in Google Ireland Ltd. and
Facebook Ireland Ltd., respectively.69 Ireland is a low-tax EU Member State,
imposing a mere 12.5% corporate tax rate for trading income70 and a 6.25% rate
for revenues related to a company’s patent or IP operations.71 When examining
activity within EU States, studies show that in each of Spain, Italy, France,
Germany and the U.K.,72 Google had over thirty million internet users, and
Facebook had over twenty million accounts.73 In Ireland, meanwhile, Google
had fewer than ten million internet users and Facebook had fewer than five
64. New corporate tax statistics provide fresh insights into the activities of multinational
enterprises, OECD (July 8, 2020), https://www.oecd.org/tax/new-corporate-tax-statistics-provide-fresh-
insights-into-the-activities-of-multinational-enterprises.htm.
65. Approximately $22 billion, and $13.5 billion, respectively. See UNCTAD 2019 Report,
supra note 11, at 95.
66. Approximately $389 million. Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 80 (Feb. 1,
2018).
67. Approximately $58.4 billion, and $16.5 billion, respectively. See UNCTAD 2019 Report,
supra note 11, at 95.
68. Approximately $1.7 billion. See Alphabet Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 80-81 (Feb.
5, 2018).
69. Tang & Bussink, supra note 52, at 3.
70. A higher 25% corporate tax rate applies to non-trading (passive) income. See Corporation
Tax (CT), IRISH TAX & CUSTOMS, (May 3, 2019), https://www.revenue.ie/en/companies-and-
charities/corporation-tax-for-companies/corporation-tax/basis-of-charge.aspx.
71. The lower rate, known as a “knowledge development box” relates to software that was
improved, created, or developed in Ireland. See Knowledge Development Box (KDB), IRISH TAX &
CUSTOMS (Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.revenue.ie/en/companies-and-charities/reliefs-and-exemptions/
knowledge-development-box-kdb/index.aspx.
72. The U.K. withdrew from the EU on January 31, 2020, with a transition period until
December 31, 2021. The U.K. is referred to as EU Member State because the data presented herein refers
to the period prior to its withdrawal. For more on the U.K.’s withdrawal from the EU, see European
Council, Decision (EU) 2020/135 on the Conclusion of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic
Energy Community, L 29/1 (Jan. 30, 2020).
73. Tang & Bussink, supra note 52, at 3.
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million accounts.74 In 2015, Google reported over €22 billion in revenues in
Ireland despite the smaller Irish consumer market. The next-closest country in
terms of revenue reporting was the U.K., where Google reported fewer than €2
billion in revenues, despite having almost sixty million users there.75 A similar
pattern can be observed in the reports of Facebook Ireland Ltd., where Facebook
reported over €7 billion in revenues. The next-closest country was also the U.K.,
where just over €2 billion in revenues was reported, despite having almost forty
million Facebook accounts.76
In 2015, both Google and Facebook paid very limited taxes in Ireland.
Google paid only €47.8 million in taxes on €22.6 billion of Google Ireland Ltd.
revenue, according to company filings.77 Facebook, meanwhile, paid only €16.5
million in Ireland taxes on its €7.9 billion of Facebook Ireland Ltd. revenue.78
This was accomplished by taking advantage of BEPS mechanisms in order to
minimize tax liability. Part of Google’s tax planning strategy, for example,
involved shifting billions of euros to a Dutch subsidiary and then to a Bermuda-
based company. MNEs continue to minimize taxation in market countries by
avoiding a taxable presence, or in the case of a taxable presence, shifting profits
to lower-tax jurisdictions through trading structures and favorable tax treaties.79
Using BEPS thereby results in reducing an MNE’s total tax liability as well as
its tax liability in the particular markets, creating under-taxation.
III. FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS
The challenges of taxing the digital economy can generally be summarized
by two key tax policy questions: first, how to establish taxing rights (nexus) in
jurisdictions where foreign businesses have significant commercial presence
with little or no physical presence and, second, how and where to allocate the
taxable profits of MNEs.80
Addressing these issues is not just a present-day challenge. The PE
concept, which emerged in the German Empire over a century ago,81 has been
extensively evaluated during the past decades due to changes in business
methods and the development of technology. In 1978, former U.S. Assistant
Secretary of Treasury Stanley Surrey recognized that technological
advancements required reassessing traditional PE norms. Surrey claimed that
“modern methods of business and communication” made some requirements of
74. Id. at 3-4.
75. Id. at 3.
76. Id. at 4.
77. See Simon Bowers, Google pays €47m in tax in Ireland on €22bn sales revenue,
, o , , u o u o oo -pays-47m-euros-
tax-ireland-22bn-euros-revenue.
78. SeeMark Paul, Facebook staff paid €123,000 as revenues surge to €7.9bn, ,
Dec. 12, 2016, https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/facebook-staff-paid-123-000-as-
revenues-surge-to-7-9bn-1.2902701.
79. OECD, supra note 5, at 78.
80. 2017 EC Communication, supra note 58, at 7.
81. K ,
,
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the OECD Model Tax Convention obsolete.82 According to Surrey, developing
countries had accepted the PE concept, yet sought to expand the PE definition
and narrow the extent to which it limited source taxation. Such expansion would
allocate more taxing rights to market jurisdictions and therefore benefit
developing countries.83 In 1997, Reuven Avi-Yonah argued that the rise of
electronic commerce presented a challenge to traditional concepts of
international taxation.84 Avi-Yonah proposed expanding the PE concept with a
de minimis threshold of gross income earned within the taxing jurisdiction. Once
over the de minimis threshold, income from electronic commerce would be taxed
in the jurisdiction where goods and services are consumed.85 In 2003, Arthur J.
Cockfield proposed modifying the PE principle to account for modern
commercial practices that “permit nonresident firms to generate significant
revenues in foreign markets without the need for a physical presence.”86
Cockfield stated that a PE based on quantitative economic presence would be
consistent with historic PE rationales and could restore a balanced sharing of tax
revenues among countries.87
Digitalization is considered further reason to promote the reform of
international tax rules. Scholars have argued that the current PE definition
requires structural changes to address the new business models developed in the
digital economy.88 Peter Hongler and Pascale Pistone have proposed a new PE
nexus based on digital presence, which considers the number of users in a
contracting State as a threshold for PE.89 Wolfgang Schön has proposed
allocating taxing rights based on investments of digital firms into a market
jurisdiction.90 Andrés Báez Moreno and Yariv Brauner have argued that
“tweaking” international tax rules by attempting to tax foreign MNEs in market
jurisdictions would be ineffective91 and have recommended imposing a
82. Stanley Surrey, United Nations Group of Experts and the Guidelines for Tax Treaties
Between Developed and Developing Countries, ’ ,
83. Id.
84. SeeReuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV.
507, 555 (1997); Professor Avi-Yonah is the Director of the International Tax LL.M. Program at Michigan
Law School.
85. Id. at 510.
86. See Arthur J. Cockfield, Reforming the Permanent Establishment Principle through a
Quantitative Economic Presence Test, , Professor Arthur J. Cockfield is a
professor at Queen’s University Faculty of Law.
87. Id. at 408-410.
88. See Peter Hongler & Pasquale Pistone, Blueprints for a New PE Nexus to Tax Business
Income in the Era of the Digital Economy 2 (Vienna University of Economics & Business, International
Taxation Research Paper Series, No. 2015-15, 2015); Professor Pistone is the Academic Chairman of
IBFD; Professor Hongler is a Professor of Tax Law at the University of St. Gallen.
89. Id. at 3.
90. SeeWolfgang Schön, One Answer to Why and How to Tax the Digitalized Economy 18-24
(Max Planck Institute for Tax Law & Public Finance, Working Paper No. 2019-10, 2019); Professor
Schön is the Director of the Department of Business and Tax Law at the Max Planck Institute for Tax
Law and Public Finance in Munich.
91. See Andres Báez Moreno & Yariv Brauner, Taxing the Digital Economy Post BEPS . . .
Seriously 5-7 (University of Florida Levin College of Law, Research Paper No. 19-16, 2019); Professor
Báez Moreno is an Associate Professor of tax law at Universidad Carlos III in Madrid; Professor Brauner
is Chair in Taxation and Professor of law at the University of Florida Levin College of Law.
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withholding tax on base-eroding payments to non-residents.92
This short overview provides a mere introduction to the broad variety of
scholarly perspectives on reforming international tax rules. Nonetheless, legal
scholarship has generally indicated that reconsidering traditional international
tax norms is necessary given modern business practices. This conclusion has
resonated with much of the world, including governments and supranational
organizations. As written by Itai Grinberg, “All the largest economies have come
to agree either that a) there is something wrong with the taxation of the ‘digital
economy,’ or b) there is something more fundamentally wrong with the structure
of the current international tax system in an era of globalization and
digitalization.”93 Addressing the tax challenges of digitalization has thereby been
driven mostly by the world’s prominent, developed economies: the OECD and
EU organizations, as well as their Member States.
IV. THE OECD PROPOSAL
A. The OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project
The tax challenges arising from digitalization have been identified as one
of the main areas of focus in the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project
(BEPS Project). Through reports spanning several years and a blueprint in
October 2020,94 the OECD aims to achieve a consensus-based long-term
solution to address the tax challenges arising from digitalization by the middle
of 2021.95
At the 2012 G20 Los Cabos summit,96 the G20 tasked the OECD with
developing a BEPS Project Action Plan,97 which was later approved at the 2013
G20 St. Petersburg summit.98 A primary goal of the BEPS Project is to prevent
MNEs from artificially shifting profits to low tax jurisdictions.99 The OECD
recognizes the broad impact of globalization on countries’ corporate income tax
regimes, and the opportunities that MNEs have to greatly minimize tax burdens
in an integrated global economy.100 The use of BEPS to shift taxable profits hurts
governments that need to cope with revenue losses and spend on compliance
measures while their tax systems are undermined. Meanwhile, taxpayers and
92. Id. at 7-8.
93. See Grinberg, supra note 28, at 85.
94. OECD, Tax Challenges Arising fromDigitalisation: Report on Pillar One Blueprint (2020),
https://read.oecd.org/10.1787/beba0634-en?format=pdf.
95. Id. at 9.
96. The G20 is an international forum comprising 19 countries and the EU, and representing the
world’s major developed and emerging economies. Together, the G20 members represent 85 % of global
GDP, 75% of international trade and two-thirds of the world’s population. For more, see About G20,
OECD, https://www.oecd.org/g20/about/.
97. OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (2013), https://www.oecd.org/
ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf.
98. G20, Tax Annex to the St. Petersburg G20 Leaders’ Declaration, at 5 (Sept. 2013),
https://www.oecd.org/g20/summits/saint-petersburg/Tax-Annex-St-Petersburg-G20-Leaders-Declara
tion.pdf.
99. OECD, supra note 97, at 8.
100. Id. at 7.
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domestic businesses bear a greater share of the tax burden and are at a
competitive disadvantage versus large MNEs.101 Addressing the tax challenges
of digitalization has thus been the priority and focus of the BEPS Project.102
In 2015, a fifteen-point Action Plan was released by the OECD to address
the issues presented by BEPS. Action 1 is titled “Addressing the Tax Challenges
of the Digital Economy,”103 and meticulously describes the challenges, key
features, policy concerns, and future work to be conducted on taxing the digital
economy. Action 1 concluded that the digital economy presents key features that
exacerbate BEPS risks.104 The OECD elected to continue working through an
OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS, and to deliver an interim report in
2018 and a final report in 2020,105 later pushed to 2021.106 The Inclusive
Framework is a collaboration of 137 countries on implementation of BEPS and
international tax rules, extending far beyond OECDMember States.107 The 2018
InterimReport did not advise provisional measures, and restated the commitment
to a consensus-based solution.108 The OECD’s efforts substantially advanced in
2019, when the Inclusive Framework introduced a two-pillar approach to form
the basis for a long-term consensus. Pillar One would address the broader
challenges of digitalization and prescribe new profit allocation and nexus rules,
while Pillar Two would address remaining BEPS issues including a global
minimum tax rate.109
B. The OECD’s Pillar One
On October 9, 2019, the Secretariat of the OECD published a “Proposal for
a “Unified Approach” under Pillar One,” designed to address the tax challenges
of digitalization and grant new taxing rights to market jurisdictions.110 The
proposal established a new taxing right independent of physical presence,
applied through global and market revenue thresholds. The proposal set forth a
new rule that would allocate a share of a foreign company’s deemed residual
(non-routine) profits to the market jurisdiction.111 On October 14, 2020, the
OECD released a “Report on Pillar One Blueprint” providing foundation for a
future agreement on international tax reform.112 Pillar One consists of three main
101. Id. at 8.
102. See OECD, supra note 5.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 143.
105. OECD, Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation: Interim Report 2018, at 212 (2018),
https://read.oecd.org/10.1787/9789264293083-en?format=pdf.
106. OECD, supra note 94, at 9.
107. See OECD, supra note 1.
108. OECD, supra note 105, at 212.
109. OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy: Policy Note,
at 1 (2019), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/policy-note-beps-inclusive-framework-addressing-tax-
challenges-digitalisation.pdf
110. OECD, Public Consultation Document: Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified Approach”
under Pillar One, at 6 (2019), http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-document-secretariat-
proposal-unified-approach-pillar-one.pdf.
111. Id. at 5-6.
112. OECD, supra note 94 at 8.
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components: a new taxing right for market jurisdictions over a portion of residual
(non-routine) profits calculated at the MNE-group level; a fixed return for
baseline marketing and distribution functions that physically transpire in the
market jurisdiction; and dispute prevention and resolution mechanisms.113 The
Pillar One Blueprint was opened to public consultation for stakeholder input114
and endorsed by the G20115 with the aim of achieving a consensus-based solution
by the middle of 2021.116
1. Pillar One Scope
Pillar One’s scope is generally broad and includes both automated digital
services and other consumer-facing businesses.117 Automated digital services
include a non-exhaustive list of business models such as online search engines,
social media platforms, online intermediation platforms (including
marketplaces), digital content streaming, online gaming, cloud computing, and
online advertising.118 Excluded activities include online sales of physical goods,
customized professional services, and the provision of internet access.119 The
category of consumer-facing businesses refers to businesses that generate
revenue from goods and services commonly sold to consumers.120 These include
a non-exhaustive list of business sectors such as automobiles, branded foods,
clothes and cosmetics, mobile phones, home appliances, and computing
products.121 Excluded from this category are financial services, natural resource
extraction, construction, and international airline and shipping businesses.122
While the OECD has worked diligently to define these categories, it has yet to
achieve a political agreement on how these categories should be used.123
The goal of Pillar One is to address the tax challenges of digitalization
while recognizing the difficulty of characterizing what is digital and what is not,
which is a major tax policy consideration. The OECD has expressed that
“because the digital economy is increasingly becoming the economy itself, it
would be difficult, if not impossible, to ring-fence the digital economy from the
113. Id. at 11.
114. Public comments received on the Report on Pillar One and Pillar Two Blueprint, OECD
(Dec. 16, 2020), http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-comments-received-on-the-reports-on-pillar-one-
and-pillar-two-blueprints.htm.
115. G20, Communiqué: G20 Finance Ministers & Central Bank Governors Meeting (Oct. 14,
2020), http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2020/2020-g20-finance-1014.html.
116. OECD, supra note 94, at 9.
117. Id. at 20.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. This category relates to individuals who purchase items for personal use and not for
commercial or professional purposes. This would also bring into scope those that sell consumer products
through intermediaries who perform routine tasks such as packaging or assembly. See OECD, Statement
by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS on the Two-Pillar Approach to Address the Tax
Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy, at 11 (2020), https://www.oecd.
org/tax/beps/statement-by-the-oecd-g20-inclusive-framework-on-beps-january-2020.pdf.
121. Id.
122. OECD, supra note 94, at 49.
123. Id.at 12.
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rest of the economy for tax purposes.”124 In an ever-digitalizing world, isolating
digital businesses would indeed violate the neutrality of the tax system and
require drawing arbitrary lines between the digital and non-digital fields.125
2. New Taxing Right (Amount A)
For businesses falling within the Pillar One scope, a new taxing right
(Amount A) is introduced, and applies on top of existing nexus and profit
allocation rules.126 It will apply where a business has a sustained and significant
involvement in the economy of a market jurisdiction irrespective of its physical
presence in that jurisdiction.127 The new taxing right would be introduced as a
standalone rule—on top of the PE rule—to “limit any unintended spill-over
effect on other existing rules.”128 It would include a revenue threshold based on
annual consolidated group revenue, together with a de minimis foreign in-scope
revenue carve-out.129 This means the inclusion of a global “revenue test”
threshold that would apply the new taxing right only to companies of a certain
scale. This threshold would refer to the total gross revenues of an MNE,
determined at the level of the company group.130 A secondary “de minimis
foreign in-scope revenue test” would then be applied to MNEs that exceed the
global threshold, yet have only small in-scope revenues.131 This carveout, an
absolute number, would be applied to determine the MNEs in scope of Amount
A. The goal is to achieve a similar result for MNEs who engage in foreign market
jurisdictions to a smaller extent, regardless of whether their engagement is
significantly smaller than a domestic business.132
A political decision will be necessary to design and determine the global
“revenue test” threshold amount. According to the Pillar One Blueprint, the
global threshold ought to be at least €750 million, because a lower threshold will
go beyond tax administrations’ capacity to operate the new taxing right.133 A
€750 million amount also corresponds to the threshold for country-by-country
reporting requirements under BEPS Action 13.134 Under this threshold, an MNE
reporting under €750 million of annual revenues would not be subject to the new
taxing right. Such a size-limitation would apply Pillar One only to considerably
large MNEs. According to the OECD’s estimates, a €750 million global revenue
124. OECD, supra note 5, at 142.
125. Hongler & Pistone, supra note 88, at 42.
126. OECD, supra note 94, at 13.
127. OECD, supra note 110, at 8.
128. Id. Because Amount A applies on top of existing profit allocation rules, it will be necessary
to eliminate double taxation in the event that profits of an MNE are already allocated to the market
jurisdiction under existing rules. A mechanism to eliminate double taxation will identify which of the
MNE’s entities are liable for the Amount A tax and determine the methods to eliminate double taxation in
their respect. See OECD, supra note 94. at 139.
129. OECD, supra note 94, 12-13.
130. Id. at 58.
131. Id. at 59.
132. Id. at 59-60.
133. Id. at 59.
134. OECD, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting, Action 13 -
2015 Final Report, at 12 (2015), https://read.oecd.org/10.1787/9789264241480-en?format=pdf.
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threshold applies the new rule to approximately 8,000 MNEs, and only to a
maximum of approximately 2,300MNEs whose primary activities are automated
digital services and consumer-faced business.135 The OECD proposes a solely
revenue-based threshold for automated digital businesses, but would require a
“plus factor” in addition to the global revenue threshold to create a taxable nexus
for other consumer-facing businesses.136 This proposed plus factor would be an
independent PE test identifying a fixed place of business through which an in-
scope, consumer-facing business of the MNE is operating.137
3. New Nexus and Profit Allocation Rule
Businesses falling within Pillar One’s scope will be subject to the new
nexus that is based on significant and sustained engagement with the market
jurisdiction.138 This will be indicated by a market revenue threshold applied to
the in-scope revenue of an MNE that is generated in the market jurisdiction.139
The Pillar One Blueprint indicates that market revenue thresholds could be
adjusted to the size of the market (such as by GDP), and that different thresholds
could apply to automated digital services and to consumer-facing businesses.140
It is therefore possible to view Pillar One as creating two thresholds: a global
revenue threshold at the MNE group level and a threshold for revenue generated
in the market jurisdiction. Both thresholds would need to be satisfied to give rise
to the new taxing right and nexus in the market jurisdiction. A set of revenue
sourcing principles would be established to determine the revenues considered
to be derived from a particular market jurisdiction.141
Pillar One would also include a new profit allocation norm that allocates a
portion of an MNE’s residual (non-routine) profits to the market jurisdiction.142
The profit allocation mechanism of Amount A involves three steps: first, the
135. OECD, supra note 94, at 59; note that this estimation does not indicate whether and to what
extent all of these MNEs will indeed be subject to the new tax, because such determination depends on
activity in the market jurisdiction (the market threshold). This simply means that the maximum number
of MNEs that can possibly be subject to the new right is approximately 2,300.
136. The Pillar One Blueprint justifies the distinction between automated digital services and
consumer-facing businesses in the difference of market presence, profitability, and compliance burdens
between the two. Consumer-facing businesses are not as profoundly able to participate remotely in market
jurisdictions. Moreover, profit margins for consumer-facing businesses are typically lower than for
automated digital services, and with higher complexity and compliance costs, which points to the higher
threshold and “plus factors.” See id. at 65.
137. Id. at 65-66.
138. Id. at 66.
139. Id. at 66.
140. Id. at 66-68. The Inclusive Framework also recommends a “plus-factor” presence test for
determining significant market activity for consumer-facing businesses.
141. Id. at 71-72. Sourcing principles are identified for each in-scope revenue and are coupled
with indicators to determine the source jurisdiction. See id. at 73-99 for list and description of relevant
sourcing rules.
142. Id. at 8. The new norm goes beyond existing norms, such as the arm’s-length principle and
Authorized OECD Approach. Under current international tax rules, profit attribution is generally
governed by Articles 7 (Business Profits) and 9 (Associate Enterprises) of the OECD Model Tax
Convention. Article 7 provides that profits of an enterprise that are attributable to the PE may be taxable
in that State. Article 9 provides that States have taxing rights over enterprises transacting with associate
enterprises. See OECDModel Tax Convention, supra note 26, at arts. 7, 9.
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MNE group’s routine profits would need to be identified, and a profitability
threshold would separate the allocable residual (non-routine) profits from routine
activities.143 Routine functions are excluded from the pool of profits that would
be allocated to the market jurisdiction. Pillar One recognizes that some
companies may need to calculate their Amount A tax base on a segmented basis,
which would be derived from the consolidated financial statements under the
accounting standards of the MNE’s headquarter jurisdiction.144 Second, Pillar
One would determine a fixed reallocation percentage from the share of residual
(non-routine) profits that would be allocated to market jurisdictions under
Amount A. This step excludes factors such as trade intangibles, capital, and risk
from allocation to the market jurisdiction. The allocable tax base would therefore
be determined through a fixed percentage of the residual profits.145 The final step
would be to allocate the relevant portion of the deemed residual (non-routine)
profits among the eligible market jurisdictions (where nexus has been
created).146 Note that the Amount A calculation would be subject to a marketing
and distribution safe harbor. This would cap Amount A allocations with respect
to market jurisdictions that already enjoy taxing rights over an MNE’s residual
profits. Consequently, an MNE would not incur Amount A tax liability if existing
marketing and distribution profits exceed its safe harbor return.147 The Amount
A allocation would be performed by filing a standardized self-assessment return
and documentation package with the parent jurisdiction, which would then be
exchanged between tax administrations relevant to the MNE’s operations.148 To
better provide early tax certainty, Amount A would include a binding dispute
prevention and resolution mechanism.149
Consider the following simplified example for applying the new taxing
right under Amount A, where an MNE does not maintain physical presence in the
market jurisdiction.150 Assume that MNE XGroup provides online streaming
services. YCorp (resident of Country 1) is the parent company of XGroup. It
owns XGroup’s intangible assets and is entitled to all its non-routine profits.
ZCorp (resident of Country 2), a subsidiary of YCorp, is responsible for
marketing and distributing XGroup’s streaming services. Assume also that in
Country 3, XGroup does not maintain a taxable presence under existing rules.
ZCorp, however, makes remote sales in Country 3. XGroup has €800 million of
global gross revenues and makes sufficient sales to satisfy the market threshold
of Country 3. It is necessary to determine whether Country 3 has a right to tax
the profits of XGroup under the new taxing right. Because both the global gross
143. OECD, supra note 94, at 123.
144. These statements are typically prepared in accordance with the Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP) or the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Note that
Amount A includes loss carry-forward rules. Unlike profits, losses accrued in a tax period would not be
allocated to a market jurisdiction. Id. at 98-102.
145. Id. at 123.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 123-24.
148. Id. at 170.
149. Id. at 190.
150. Example provided originally by OECD. See OECD, supra note 110, at 12.
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revenue and market revenue thresholds are satisfied, XGroup has tax nexus in
Country 3. Assuming all other necessary criteria are met, Country 3 would have
the right to tax a portion of the deemed residual (non-routine) profits of XGroup
(Amount A), in an amount not exceeding the marketing and distribution cap.
Country 3 may tax that income directly from YCorp, since YCorp is considered
to have a taxable presence in Country 3 under the new Pillar One nexus rules.151
Amount A would be allocated after a return is filed with the parent jurisdiction,
which would be subject to a panel review of interested tax administrations if
necessary.152 The new rule thus redistributes international taxing rights to market
jurisdictions. It also limits profit shifting by creating tax liability in the source
country and allocating profits to the market jurisdiction even when anMNE does
not have physical presence in a market. The implementation of Pillar One will
then require translation and adoption into the domestic laws of jurisdictions.153
A new multilateral convention may be necessary to implement Amount A on an
international scale and to remove existing barriers within bilateral tax treaties.154
4. Amount B
Amount B applies only by way of traditional physical nexus in the market
jurisdiction. It is not applicable byway of the new taxing right (Amount A), which
is administered irrespective of physical nexus. Amount B establishes a fixed
return for certain “baseline” or routine marketing and distribution functions that
occur in the market jurisdiction.155 The fixed return under Amount B aims to
reduce disputes, particularly with respect to applying transfer pricing rules.
Amount B would benefit tax administrations and taxpayers by increasing tax
certainty and reducing the risk of double taxation.156
5. Initial U.S. Response
In response to the progress on Pillar One, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury
under the Trump administration, Steven Mnuchin, expressed that the U.S. has
“serious concerns regarding potential mandatory departures from arm’s-length
transfer pricing and taxable nexus standards — longstanding pillars of the
international tax system upon which U.S. taxpayers rely.”157 According to
Mnuchin, the goals of Pillar One could be accomplished by making Pillar One
an optional “safe harbor” regime.158 A safe harbor regime suggests that
companies would be able to opt into Pillar One and elect whether the new rules
would apply. The U.S. Treasurywishes to protect U.S.-basedMNEs from paying
151. Id.
152. OECD, supra note 94, at 176.
153. Id. at 205.
154. Id. at 207.
155. OECD, supra note 110, at 15.
156. Id.
157. Letter from U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin to OECD Secretary-General
José Ángel Gurría (Dec. 3, 2019), https://aboutbtax.com/NgX. [hereinafter Steven Mnuchin Letter to
Gurría].
158. Id.
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tax in other countries, thereby also protecting the interests of taxing rights of the
U.S. as the residence country. Consider that any tax policy that redistributes
taxing rights to source countries hurts U.S. interests as a predominantly residence
country (of MNEs). By the OECD’s own assessment, digital tech hubs exporting
research and development (R&D) would lose the most from Pillar One’s
redistribution of taxing rights among jurisdictions.159 Implementing Pillar One
as a safe harbor would undermine the OECD’s efforts because it would
encourage tax planning on the part of MNEs, who would be enabled to make
business decisions based on tax considerations. Profit shifting would then be
stimulated, rather than eliminated. The prospect of implementing Pillar One
entirely as a safe harbor has largely been rejected by the OECD.160
The OECD’s tax reform plans hit a roadblock when Mnuchin, in a June
2020 letter addressed to four European finance ministers, expressed that global
discussions had reached an impasse.161 According toMnuchin, the U.S. is unable
to agree on changes to international tax law affecting U.S. digital companies.162
Mnuchin added that “this is a time when governments around the world should
focus their attention on dealing with the economic issues resulting from COVID-
19.”163 Despite the discouraging statements, Pascal Saint-Amans, director of the
OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, has ensured that discussions
on international tax reform remain ongoing and that the U.S. is still present and
engaged in the negotiations.164
159. The impact assessment of Pillar One will be discussed in infra section IV.B.7. See OECD,
OECD Secretary-General Tax Report to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, at 12 (Feb.
2020), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/oecd-secretary-general-tax-report-g20-finance-ministers-riyadh-saudi-
arabia-february-2020.pdf; Sigurd Næss-Schmidt et al., Future Taxation of Company Profits: What to do
with Intangibles?, at 9, COPENHAGEN ECONOMICS (Feb. 19, 2019).
160. José Ángel Gurría, Secretary-General of the OECD, has expressed that Pillar One could not
be an optional safe-harbor regime. See OECD, Letter from OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría to
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/Letter-
from-OECD-Secretary-General-Angel-Gurria-for-the-attention-of-The-Honorable-Steven-T-Mnuchin-
Secretary-of-the-Treasury-United-States.pdf. French Minister of Economy and Finance Bruno Le Maire
stated that making Pillar One an optional safe harbor would be unacceptable to France and its partners in
the OECD. Le Maire expressed that companies would not be willingly taxed in a safe-harbor regime, and
an OECD agreement must therefore be binding on all companies. Stephanie Soong Johnston, France
Rebuffs U.S. Attempt to Alter Global Tax Reform Proposal, TAX NOTES TODAY INT’L, Dec. 9, 2019,
https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-international/digital-economy/france-rebuffs-us-attempt-
alter-global-tax-reform-proposal/2019/12/09/2b6g3; The Inclusive Framework stated that implementing
Pillar One on a safe-harbor basis “could raise major difficulties, increase uncertainty and fail to meet all
of the policy objectives of the overall process,” OECD, supra note 120, at 14.
161. The letter was sent to French Minister of Economy and Finance Bruno Le Maire, U.K.
Chancellor of the Exchequer Rishi Sunak, Spanish Minister of the Treasury María Jesús Montero and
Italian Minister of Economy and Finance Roberto Gualtieri. See Letter from U.S. Secretary Treasury
Steven Mnuchin to Bruno Le Maire, Rishi Sunak, María Jesús Montero, and Roberto Gualtieri (Jun. 12,
2020), https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/us/pdf/2020/06/tnf-mnuchin-oecd-jun19-2020.PDF [Steven
Mnuchin Letter to Finance Ministers].
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Saint-Amans spoke at a Bloomberg Tax and Accounting event on June 24, 2020. Saint-
Amans expressed that the U.S. has not “walked away” from negotiations, unlike what has been reported.
Saint-Amans stated that the U.S. remains engaged in negotiations to achieve a multilateral solution but
believes that an agreement should be pushed to 2021 or at least after the U.S. presidential election in
November 2020. The timeline for achieving a consensus-based solution has indeed been pushed to mid-
2021. See David Schultz, Talking Tax: Pascal Saint-Amans on Progress With Global Tax Talks,
BLOOMBERG TAX, https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/pascal-saint-amans-on-progress-
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On January 25, 2021, Dr. Janet Yellen was confirmed as U.S. Secretary of
the Treasury under the Joe Biden administration. In her nomination hearing
before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, Yellen expressed that the Biden
administration is “committed to the cooperative multilateral effort to address
base erosion and profit sharing through the OECD/G20 process, and to resolving
the digital taxation disputes in that context.”165
6. Notes on Pillar Two
On November 8, 2019, the Secretariat of the OECD published a proposal
for Pillar Two of its two-pillar approach titled “Global Anti-Base Erosion
Proposal (“GloBE”): Pillar Two.”166 On October 14, 2020, the OECD released
its Report on the Pillar Two Blueprint, together with the Pillar One Blueprint.167
Pillar Two complements Pillar One by addressing remaining BEPS challenges.
It is designed to ensure that the profits of MNEs are subject to a minimum rate
of tax irrespective of where they are headquartered or the jurisdictions in which
they operate.168 A minimum rate of corporate income tax would reduce
taxpayers’ incentive to engage in profit shifting and would establish a floor for
tax competition among jurisdictions.169 According to several models, a global
minimum tax rate is anticipated to generate tax revenues worldwide,170 and Pillar
Two has generally encountered broader support among developed countries.171
The global minimum corporate tax is viewed as an important measure to reduce
tax planning and profit shifting by MNEs. Secretary Mnuchin, for example, has
expressed the U.S.’s full support of Pillar Two, unlike the concerns presented
over Pillar One.172 Mnuchin also insisted that Pillar Two discussions remain on
track, despite the disagreements on Pillar One.173 Pillar Two is an anti-tax haven
measure that will benefit the U.S. and other large economies and will require
broad coordination and cooperation among jurisdictions in order to be
administered.174
with-global-tax-talks-podcast at 05:30 (June 25, 2020).
165. Yellen responded to a question posed by Senator Chuck Grassley. See U.S. Senate,
Committee on Finance, Finance Committee Questions for the Record, Hearing on the Nomination of Dr.
Janet Yellen: Responses by Dr. Yellen, at 8 (Jan. 21, 2021).
166. OECD, Public Consultation Document: Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal (“GloBE”):
Pillar Two, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-document-global-anti-base-erosion-
proposal-pillar-two.pdf.pdf (2019).
167. OECD, Tax Challenges Arising fromDigitalisation: Report on Pillar Two Blueprint (2020),
https://read.oecd.org/10.1787/abb4c3d1-en?format=pdf.
168. Id. at 14.
169. OECD, supra note 166, at 6.
170. Clemens Fuest et al., International Corporate Taxation: What Reforms? What Impact?, 54
LES NOTES DU CONSEIL D’ANALYSE ÉCONOMIQUE 1, 10 (Nov. 2019).
171. Achim Pross, head of the international cooperation and tax administration division at the
OECD’s Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, has commented on this matter. See Stephanie Soong
Johnston, OECD Calls for Design Advice on GLOBE Minimum Tax Proposal, TAX NOTES TODAY INT’L,
Nov. 18, 2019, https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-international/digital-economy/oecd-calls-design-
advice-globe-minimum-tax-proposal/2019/11/18/2b3xc
172. Steven Mnuchin Letter to Gurría, supra note 157.
173. Steven Mnuchin Letter to Finance Ministers, supra note 161.
174. Pillar Two includes an “income inclusion rule” that would tax the income of a foreign branch
or a controlled entity if that income was subject to tax at a rate below the minimum rate. OECD, supra
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A public consultation on the Pillar Two Proposal was held on December 9,
2019, where companies such as Amazon and Unilever expressed support for
Pillar Two, endorsing it as an important step towards a coherent international tax
system.175 Public consultations on the Pillar One and Two Blueprints were
opened for stakeholder input and held in January 2021.176 Following the release
of the Pillar Two Proposal, Minister Le Maire expressed support for both pillars
and suggested a 12.5% rate for global minimum taxation.177 Some have
conveyed criticism that a global minimum tax impedes on the sovereign right of
countries to elect their own corporate tax rate.178 Irish Finance Minister Paschal
Donohoe, for example, has conveyed Ireland’s opposition to any kind of global
minimum tax proposal.179 Ireland, among other low-tax jurisdictions and tax
havens, would lose its competitive advantage as well as some jurisdictional
sovereignty in a global minimum tax regime.
7. Impact Assessments
Several estimates of revenue effects of the OECD reforms have emerged.
Copenhagen Economics180 estimates that in 2017, 18% to 21% of the corporate
tax base in Sweden, Denmark, and Finland was derived from foreign residual
profits.181 In Germany, that share was approximately 17%. Copenhagen
Economics found that under the OECD proposal, the bulk of this corporate tax
revenue would be allocated to different countries.182 The losses these countries
will suffer can be attributed to their intensive R&D exporting sectors, which have
substantial residual returns. The R&D industry exporters are targets of the new
taxing right due to their reliance on intangibles and digital business models that
do not depend on physical presence.
According to a November 2019 report by the French Council of Economic
Analysis,183 Pillar One would negligibly affect tax revenues in most non-tax
note 167, at 112-14.
175. Amazon, Comments on the Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal: Pillar Two, at 1 (Dec. 2,
2019), https://www.dropbox.com/s/bbykwyz39gosgbf/oecd-public-comments-globe-proposal-pillar-
two-december-2019.zip?dl=0 (available for download under “Amazon”).
176. Public Consultation Meeting on the Reports on the Pillar One and Pillar Two Blueprints,
OECD (Jan. 14-15, 2021), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-meeting-reports-on-the-
pillar-one-and-pillar-two-blueprints.htm.
177. Stephanie Soong Johnston, France Endorses OECD Pillar 1 Global Tax Overhaul
Proposal, TAX NOTES TODAY INT’L, Nov. 26, 2019, https://www.taxnotes.com/beps-expert/digital-
economy/france-endorses-oecd-pillar-1-global-tax-overhaul-proposal/2019/11/27/2b5gn.
178. EY, Comments on Public Consultation Document Global Anti-Base Erosion (“GloBE”)
Proposal: Pillar Two, at 1 (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.dropbox.com/s/bbykwyz39gosgbf/oecd-public-
comments-globe-proposal-pillar-two-december-2019.zip?dl=0&file_subpath=%2FPublished+3+Decem
ber+2019%2FEY.pdf (available for download, under “EY”).
179. World Economic Forum, Davos 2019: Rethinking Taxes: Creating a Fair and Balanced
System, at 2:50 (Feb. 10, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9NgjfwZPwng.
180. Copenhagen Economics is one of the leading economics firms in Europe, with offices in
Copenhagen, Stockholm, Helsinki, and Brussels. About Us: Hard Facts. Clear Stories., COPENHAGEN
ECONOMICS, https://www.copenhageneconomics.com/about-us/hard-facts-clear-stories/.
181. Næss-Schmidt et al., supra note 159, at 9.
182. The February 2019 report analyzes the OECD’s original marketing intangibles approach,
which has since developed into the Pillar One Proposal. Id.
183. The French Conseil d’analyse économique (Council of Economic Analysis) is an
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haven countries.184 Pillar Two, however, would reduce profit shifting and
generate substantial tax revenues, without significantly impacting the
attractiveness of countries as a location to conduct business.185 According to the
French Council of Economic Analysis, the Pillar One Proposal generates an
equal number of winners and losers in terms of redistributing tax revenues, and
more winners than losers in terms of attractiveness for business.186 The Pillar
Two Proposal would generate tax revenue gains across countries without
significantly affecting their attractiveness.187
Former President of the Swiss Confederation Ueli Maurer has stated that
Switzerland’s tax revenues could drop by over CHF 5 billion (around $5.6
billion) as a result of Pillar One.188 According to Erik de Vrijer, assistant director
at the European department at the IMF, between €1.5 to €3 billion of Ireland’s
corporate tax revenue could be at risk from the international tax reforms.189
Reallocating corporate tax revenue based on the location of sales would narrow
Ireland’s tax base as a small export-centric economy. Low tax jurisdictions such
as Switzerland, Ireland, and Luxembourg would be drastically affected by the
global tax overhaul because their R&D exports would be targeted (by Pillar
One), and their favorable tax treatment would be devalued (by Pillar Two).190
According to OECD economic impact assessments, the combined effect
of Pillars One and Two would lead to significant increases in global tax revenues
and a redistribution of taxing rights to market jurisdictions.191 The OECD
estimates that Pillar One would reallocate approximately $100 billion of taxing
rights to market jurisdictions.192 On average, low- and middle-income economies
would gain from Pillar One, experiencing a higher rate of increase in revenues
than high-income economies, even though larger market jurisdictions will
benefit more in absolute terms. Investment hubs, where levels of residual profits
are high, would experience significant losses in tax base.193 These investment
independent, nonpartisan, academic, advisory body reporting to the French Prime Minister. See Council
of Economic Analysis, CONSEIL D’ANALYSE ÉCONOMIQUE, https://www.cae-eco.fr/en/p-council-of-
economic-analysis.
184. Fuest et al., supra note 170, at 1.
185. Id.
186. The French Council model examined 40 countries. Id. at 10.
187. Id.
188. Peter A. Fischer and David Vonplon, Finanzminister Ueli Maurer: «Auf die Schweiz
kommen hohe Steuerausfälle zu», NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, Nov. 5, 2019, https://www.nzz.ch/
wirtschaft/finanzminister-ueli-maurer-auf-die-schweiz-kommen-hohe-steuerausfaelle-zu-ld.1519821.
189. Cliff Taylor, International tax reform could cost State €3bn, conference told,
, , , o u o o o -tax-reform-could-
cost-state-3bn-conference-told-1.3876487.
190. Nana Ama Sarfo, The Potential Costs of the OECD’s Proposed International Tax Reform,
TAX NOTES TODAY INT’L, Dec. 2, 2019, https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-international/base-
erosion-and-profit-shifting-beps/potential-costs-oecds-proposed-international-tax-
reform/2019/12/02/2b59n.
191. OECD, supra note 159, at 12.
192. OECD, Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation: Economic Impact Assessment, at 10
(2020), https://read.oecd.org/10.1787/0e3cc2d4-en?format=pdf. Combining these effects with the U.S.
Global Intangible Low-Tax Income regime, total gains could be $60-100 billion per year.
193. Id.; OECD, supra note 159, at 12.
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hubs include traditional tax havens where corporate tax rates are 0%,194 but also
countries such as Ireland and Switzerland that have low corporate income tax
rates and high levels of residual profits.195 Countries that rely on residual profits
and that have low corporate income tax rates would lose the most by every
assessment. Overall, the OECD projects that Pillars One and Twowould increase
global corporate income tax revenues by a combined $50-80 billion dollars per
year.196
V. DIGITAL SERVICES TAXES
A. Unilateral Measures
The OECD’s efforts to address BEPS began in 2012 and remain ongoing.
While the OECD continues to labor on a multilateral solution, several countries
have responded to the tax challenges of digitalization by enacting unilateral
measures. Administrations are eager to tax revenues of highly digitalized MNEs
that commercially engage in their jurisdictions, often without a physical
presence. This desire is particularly notable during the COVID-19 pandemic in
which governments are struggling to finance the momentous costs of a global
health crisis.
Recall that according to the EC, digital and traditional domestic businesses
within the EU are subject to effective tax rates of 8.5% versus 20.9%
respectively.197 Similarly, digital and traditional international businesses are
subject to effective tax rates of 10.1% versus 23.2%, respectively.198 In
November 2019, the French Council of Economic Analysis estimated that MNEs
have significantly reduced their corporate tax burdens in France by shifting
profits to low tax jurisdictions. Revenue losses to the French government as a
result of profit shifting amount to €4.6 to €10 billion of annual tax revenues.199
Remarkably, the U.K. and Germany each lose over a whopping €12 billion a
year to tax havens,200 and Austria, Sweden, Spain, and Italy lose several billions
annually as well. Estimates show that in 2015, more than $600 billion in global
profits were shifted to tax havens.201 A European Parliament study has estimated
that corporate tax revenue losses for the EU due to profit shifting amount to
194. Such as the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, and Bahamas.
195. OECD, supra note 159, at 12.
196. OECD, supra note 192.
197. See 2017 EC Communication, supra note 58, at 6; According to the IFO Institute for
Economic Research, digital businesses were subject to tax rate of 20.9%, whereas traditional businesses
were subject to a tax rate of 26.7%. See Fuest et al., supra note 170, at 6.
198. 2017 EC Communication, supra note 58, at 6.
199. Fuest et al., supra note 170, at 4-5; Thomas R. Tørsløv et el., The Missing Profits of Nations,
at 55, at Table 2 (NBER, Working Paper No. 24701, June 2018).
200. See European Commission, Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for
a Council Directive laying down rules relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital presence
and Proposal for a Council Directive on the common system of a digital services tax on revenues resulting
from the provision of certain digital services, at 62, (EC) SWD (2018) 81 final/2 (Mar. 21, 2018)
[hereinafter 2018 EC Impact Assessment].
201. Tørsløv et el., supra note 199, at 21.
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approximately €50-70 billion per year.202 Within the EU, it is widely agreed that
highly digitalized MNEs do not pay their fair share of taxes, and that MNEs use
aggressive tax planning strategies to reduce their effective tax burdens.203 The
EC has claimed that this unlevel playing field is economically inefficient and
hurts innovation, growth, and welfare, while burdening taxpayers and eroding
tax bases.204 In order to collect more tax revenue from highly digitalized MNEs,
several countries have begun imposing unilateral digital services taxes (DSTs)
on foreign companies.
DSTs generally apply to revenues derived from activities where users play
a major role in value creation. These include revenues created from the
placement of online advertising, sale of user collected data, and by digital
platforms that facilitate interactions between users.205 DSTs usually take the
form of 2% to 7% flat taxes on gross revenues from taxable digital services
earned by large MNEs in a given jurisdiction. Under a DST, taxable entities are
businesses that typically meet both an MNE group (global revenue) threshold
and a market revenue threshold. Only an entity meeting both thresholds will be
subject to a country’s DST. The market threshold refers to sales from taxable
digital services reported in the relevant jurisdiction. Global revenue thresholds,
referring to the revenues of the MNE, are €750 million in Italy, Spain, Austria,
France, and the Czech Republic, and £500 million in the U.K..206 Market revenue
thresholds are €25 million in France and Austria,207 £25 million in the U.K.,208
CZK100 million in the Czech Republic,209 €5.5 million in Italy, 210 and €3
202. This reflects the European Parliament’s lower end estimate of the sum lost to profit shifting
in the EU. If, however, other issues such as special tax arrangements, inefficiencies in collection and other
practices are included, the revenue loss estimate rises to approximately €160-190 billion per year. See
Robert Dover et al., Bringing transparency, coordination and convergence to corporate tax policies in
the European Union: Part I: Assessment of the magnitude of aggressive corporate tax planning, at 6
(European Parliament, Research Paper, 2015).
203. 2018 EC Impact Assessment, supra note 200, at 136-38.
204. Id. at 135-37.
205. See, e.g., example, the French digital tax, available at Loi 2019-759 du 24 juillet 2019,
portant création d’une taxe sur les services numériques et modification de la trajectoire de baisse de
l’impôt sur les sociétés (1), translated in France’s Digital Tax Bill, (Government of France, Mar. 6, 2019),
https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/france-top-documents (under “France Digital Tax Bill”) [hereinafter
France Digital Tax Bill].
206. Daniel Bunn, The Italian DST Remix, TAX FOUNDATION (Jul. 23, 2019),
https://taxfoundation.org/italy-digital-tax/ [hereinafter Italian DST]; see Proyecto de Ley 121/000001, 28
de Febrero de 2020 Proyecto de Ley del Impuesto sobre Determinados Servicios Digitales [Draft Law on
the Tax on Certain Digital Services], 11 (Government of Spain, Feb. 28, 2020),
http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L14/CONG/BOCG/A/BOCG-14-A-1-1.PDF [hereinafter
Spanish Digital Services Tax]; Digitalsteuergesetz 2020 (DiStG 2020) [Digital Tax Act 2020], Oct. 30,
2019, No. 91/2019, https://perma.cc/4H7G-CTUA (Austria) [hereinafter Austrian Digital Tax Act];
France Digital Tax Bill, supra note 205; Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic (Sept. 5, 2019),
https://www.mfcr.cz/cs/aktualne/tiskove-zpravy/2019/mf-posila-vlade-navrh-zakona-o-digitalni-36066
(the original proposal) [hereinafter Czech DST Proposal]; HMRC, Policy Paper: Digital Services Tax
(Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/introduction-of-the-digital-services-
tax/digital-services-tax. [hereinafter HMRC Digital Services Tax].
207. Austria Digital Tax Act, supra note 2016.; France Digital Tax Bill, supra note 205.
208. See HMRC Digital Services Tax, supra note 206.
209. See Czech DST Proposal, supra note 206.
210. See Italian DST, supra note 206.
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million in Spain.211
While the EU has supported the discussions led by the OECD, it remains
committed to acting on its own if a global solution is not reached on digital
taxation.212 The EU’s 2021-2027 long-term budget estimated that an EU-wide
digital tax would raise approximately €1.3 billion of annual revenues.213 Levying
an EU-wide tax on companies with a turnover above €750million is incorporated
as part of a recovery plan intended to “give the Union the best possible chance
of success” in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis.214 In a June 2020 interview, EU
Executive Vice President of the EC Margrethe Vestager expressed that a global
consensus on digital taxation is the “absolutely preferable situation,” but that the
EU will push ahead on its own if necessary.215
Many non-EU States have also adopted or announced direct taxes on
digitalized businesses, through DSTs or by modifying the PE concept.216 The
Liberal Party of Canada announced a 3% tax on companies with global revenues
of at least C$1 billion and revenues in Canada of more than C$40 million.217 In
2016, India introduced a 6% equalization levy on online advertising payments
exceeding INR100,000, applying to non-residents without a PE in India.218
India’s Finance Act 2020 expanded the equalization levy, providing that
effective April 2020, a 2% equalization levy will be applied to the revenues of
e-commerce operators and suppliers.219
In 2016, the Israel Tax Authority introduced an interpretive regulation
setting forth a “digital PE” concept if substantial digital services are supplied to
Israeli consumers.220 In May 2020, the Government of Kenya passed the Kenya
211. See Spanish Digital Services Tax, supra note 206.
212. See European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, The European Council, The Council, The European Economic Social and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions, at 15, COM (2020) (May 27, 2020) [hereinafter 2020 EC
Communication].
213. Id.
214. Id. at 16.
215. Atlantic Council, European Commission Executive VP Margrethe Vestager: Transatlantic
relations in the digital age, Margrethe Vestager, at 33:10 (June 23, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QjrZwYZbo28&feature=youtu.be [hereinafterMargrethe Vestager];
On July 13, 2020, Benjamin Angel, acting director-general of the for EC’s Taxation and Customs Union,
stated that in the event of an OECD failure the EU would look to achieve a permanent solution on digital
taxation different from the route of a DST, that would build on the work of the OECD. See European
Parliament, ECON Committee meeting, Benjamin Angel, at 16:31:00 (July 13, 2020),
https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/econ-committee-meeting_20200713-1545-COMMITTEE-
ECON_vd.
216. Particularly the French DST.
217. See Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, Cost Estimate of Election Campaign
Proposal: Taxation of large technology companies, at 1, 33242261 (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.pbo-
dpb.gc.ca/web/default/files/Documents/ElectionProposalCosting/Results/33242261_EN.pdf?timestamp
=1610667496175.
218. According to reports, in 2017-18 the equalization levy collected as much as INR 550 crore.
See KR Srivats, Digital tax: Centre rakes in moolah with ‘equalisation levy’, ,
Feb. 13, 2019, https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/digital-tax-centre-rakes-in-moolah-with-
equalisation-levy/article26260963.ece. India also reformed its PE concept in 2018. See Income-tax Act,
Sec. 9, 1961-2018, https://www.incometaxindia.gov.in/Pages/acts/income-tax-act.aspx.
219. The new rule expands the equalization levy from advertising to online commerce, a lot more
broadly. The Indian Finance Act of 2020, No. 12 of 2020, 63 (Mar. 27, 2020).
220. See Israel Tax Authority, Circular No. 4/2016 Activities of foreign corporations in Israel
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Finance Bill 2020 which establishes a DST under Section 12E of the Kenyan
Income Tax Act.221 The Kenyan DST is a 1.5% gross revenue tax on income
from services derived or accrued through digital marketplaces in Kenya.222 In
December 2019, the Government of Turkey passed a DST effective in March
2020.223 The legislation is a 7.5% gross income tax on digital services including
advertising, audio, visual and digital content, and online platforms.224 In 2018,
the Government of Pakistan enacted a 5% withholding tax on payments for
offshore digital services by non-resident persons. Such services include online
advertising and distribution of digital content.225 According to a January 2021
KPMG summary, 38 countries have either announced, drafted or legislated direct
taxes targeting the digital economy.226 These include DSTs and withholding
taxes, as well as amendments to PE definitions to include digital PE.227 Note that
as of January 2021, 36 of the 38 countries working to directly tax the digital
economy were members of the OECD’s Inclusive Framework.228
B. Digital Services
DSTs target revenues derived from covered digital services. Just as it is
difficult to define the “digital economy,” it is hard to categorize “digital
services,” and definitions may differ among tax administrations. Digital services
may be comprised of a variety of online functions, including streaming content
(e.g. Netflix, Spotify), e-commerce platforms (e.g. Amazon, eBay, Alibaba),
platform connectors (e.g. Uber, Lyft, Airbnb), social networks (e.g. Facebook,
Twitter, LinkedIn), messaging services (e.g. WhatsApp, Telegram, WeChat),
search engines (e.g. Google, Bing, Yahoo!), electronic payment services (e.g.
PayPal, Venmo) and gaming (e.g. Rockstar Games, Electronic Arts, Ubisoft).
The French Digital Tax Bill, for example, covers targeted online advertising,
sales of user data for advertising purposes, and online intermediation
platforms.229 Sales through digital marketplaces Amazon and eBay, targeted
advertising through Facebook, and transactions through digital intermediary
through the internet (Apr. 11, 2016), translated at https://taxes.gov.il/English/About/Spokesman
Announcements/Pages/Ann_11042016.aspx.
221. Kenya Finance Bill 2020, Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 66, National Assembly Bills No.
10 (May 10, 2020), Sec. 4, http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2020-05/Finance%20Bill%
2C%202020_compressed.pdf.
222. Id.
223. Turkey: Digital Services, Accommodations, and Valuable Real Estate Taxes Introduced,
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/turkey-digital-
services-accommodations-and-valuable-real-estate-taxes-introduced/#:~:text=(Jan.,%E2%80%9Cvaluab
le%20real%20estate%20tax.%E2%80%9D; Law on Changes in Digital Service and Some Laws and
Decrees No. 375. No. 7194/ 30971 (Dec. 5, 2019, translated from Turkish), https://perma.cc/WZR5-C2F3.
224. Id.
225. Finance Act of 2018, 5958(2018)/Ex. Gaz, at annex C: Indemnity Bond, Sec. 8 (May 24,
2018).
226. As of January 15, 2021, three additional countries (Australia, Chile and Germany) have
abandoned their proposals, seven are “waiting for global solution,” whereas several others have
implemented indirect taxes on the digital economy such as VAT. See KPMG Summary, supra note 2, at
4.
227. Id.
228. Taiwan and Zimbabwe are the two exceptions. See OECD, supra note 1.
229. France Digital Tax Bill, supra note 205, at 6.
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platforms Airbnb and Uber, would therefore be within the scope of the French
DST.230 Transactions where a digital interface sells goods or services that it owns
are usually excluded from DSTs. For example, if Amazon sells goods from its
own inventory, or if a consumer books a room directly through a hotel website,
those activities would be excluded from the DST.231 In general, DSTs cover
digital intermediary services that connect users to each other. DSTs do not target
the pure purchase of goods online,232 which is typically entrusted to consumption
taxes such as VAT.
C. Tax Burden and Credibility
Although DSTs target large digital companies, their tax burden is rolled
over and ultimately borne by consumers. In response to the French Digital Tax
Bill, Amazon announced that it will increase seller fees on its Amazon.fr site by
3%.233 A similar announcement has been posted on Amazon’s U.K. seller
website, increasing fees for sellers by 2% due to the U.K. DST.234
Representatives from Facebook and Google have condemned the levying of
DSTs, while expressing support for the OECD’s multilateral efforts.235
In May 2020, French Minister of Economy and Finance Bruno Le Maire
announced that the French DST has already generated €350 million during its
first year.236 Notably, however, a previous Deloitte237 impact assessment
estimated that the total additional tax burden of the French DST is approximately
230. U.S. Trade Representative, Section 301 Investigation Report on France’s Digital Services
Tax, at 14-15 (Dec. 2, 2019), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Report_On_France%27s_Digital_
Services_Tax.pdf
231. Id. Giving access (for remuneration) to a digital marketplace for buying and selling cars is
considered a digital service, but the sale of a car itself through such a website is not.
232. U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 230, at 38-39.
233. The Amazon Seller Central website stated that it must adjust the fee rates on Amazon.fr to
reflect this additional cost following the 3% French DST. Stephanie Soong Johnson, Amazon Hikes Seller
Fees in Wake of French Digital Tax, TAX NOTES TODAY INT’L, Aug. 2, 2019,
https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-international/digital-economy/amazon-hikes-seller-fees-
wake-french-digital-tax/2019/08/02/29sxb; Selling on Amazon Fee Schedule, AMAZON,
https://sellercentral-europe.amazon.com/gp/help/external/help.html?itemID=F9K4BWLZXRPC
62U&language=en_GB&ref=efph_F9K4BWLZXRPC62U_cont_G200336920 (under Referral Fee
(including Digital Services Tax)).
234. Amazon has applied increased fee rates of 2% starting September 1, 2020 due to the passing
of the U.K. DST legislation. Seller Center, Fee changes in the UK following introduction of the Digital
Services Tax, AMAZON, https://sellercentral-europe.amazon.com/gp/help/external/help.html?itemID=366
DPWD5P5QFDJP&language=en_GB&ref=efph_366DPWD5P5QFDJP_cont_200336920.
235. U.S. Trade Representative, Section 301 France’s Digital Services Tax (DST) Public
Hearings, at 47-61 (Aug. 19, 2019), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/
0819USTR.pdf [hereinafter USTR Public Hearing] (statements of Nicholas Bramble, Trade Policy
Counsel, Google, and Alan Lee, Head of Global Tax Policy, Facebook).
236. This is before collection of the DST was temporarily suspended in January 2020. Sarah
Paez, French Digital Tax Brings in €350 Million in First Year, TAX NOTES TODAY INT’L, May 27, 2020,
https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-international/digital-economy/french-digital-tax-brings-
eu350-million-first-year/2020/05/27/2ckg7.
237. Deloitte is a multinational professional services network that provides audit and assurance,
tax, consulting, and risk and financial advisory services to corporations and governmental agencies
worldwide. For more on Deloitte, see Deloitte, About Us, https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/footerlinks/
about-us-deloitte.html?icid=bottom_about-us-deloitte.
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€570 million—significantly more than the tax revenue it ultimately raised.238
The tax burdenmostly reflects a rise in price levels and reduced corporate profits.
Increased tax liability is borne by consumers and businesses using digital
marketplaces, not by large digital-tech companies. The latter pass on their
increased tax burden, resulting in higher prices for consumer goods and reduced
profits for businesses using digital platforms.239 Approximately 55% of the total
tax burden is borne by consumers, 40% by businesses that use digital platforms,
and only 5% by the large digital companies originally targeted by the DST.240
DSTs also increase the risk of unrelieved double taxation,241 because the
same tax base may be taxed several times.242 Under a DST, companies are
subject to tax liability in foreign jurisdictions and could claim a foreign tax credit
(FTC), exemption, or deduction in their country of residence. For example, U.S.-
based companies could be subject to corporate tax liability in the U.S. as well as
a DST in a country such as France. Under U.S. law, corporations can claim FTC
against U.S. corporate income tax liability for income taxes paid to foreign
jurisdictions.243 To minimize tax liability, companies such as Google and
Facebook that pay the French DST could claim a U.S. FTC dollar-for-dollar
against the DST paid in France. Such claims, if accepted, will greatly reduce U.S.
corporate income tax liability, together with the taxable revenue of the U.S.
Treasury. Note however that DSTs will not necessarily be eligible for U.S. FTCs,
and would possibly fail the “income test” of Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(4).244 DSTs are
taxes levied on revenues earned from specific business activities and may not be
considered corporate income taxes, at least by U.S. standards.245 DST payments
are thus not necessarily creditable against corporate taxes paid in the residence
country.246 This may result in taxation levied in the source country (e.g. France),
as well as taxation levied on the same tax base in the residence country (e.g.
U.S.); in other words, double taxation.
Allowing DST revenues to be creditable would force the U.S. Treasury to
effectively subsidize unilateral DST regimes,247 thereby forfeiting large amounts
of tax revenue. In the event a DST is creditable, an MNE would indeed pay the
tax, but the tax burden would be shifted to the U.S. Treasury and to U.S.
238. SeeDeloitte & Taj Société D’avocats, The French Digital Service Tax: An Economic Impact
Assessment, at 27 (Mar. 22, 2019) [hereinafter Deloitte Impact Assessment].
239. Id. at Executive Summary.
240. The Deloitte Assessment predicted that lack of available data, differences in interpretation
of French law and lack of guidance to calculate the tax liability could lead to high administrative costs for
the French DST. See id. at. 27-36.
241. Gary Clyde Hufbauer &Zhiyao (Lucy) Lu, 18-15: The EU’s Proposed Digital Services Tax:
A De Facto Tariff, at 2, 7, PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (June 2018); Ruth
Mason & Leopoldo Parada, Digital Battlefront in the Tax Wars, ’ , o
14, 2018).
242. Deloitte Impact Assessment, supra note 238, at 33-36.
243. Sean Lowry, Digital Service Taxes (DSTs): Policy and Economic Analysis, at 21, CONG.
RSCH. SERV., R45532 (2019).
244. 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2(b)(4) (2019).
245. Lowry, supra note 243, at 21; U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 230, at 48.
246. Note that businesses that pay the France DST and are also subject to the corporate income
tax in France will be able to deduct the DST payment from their taxable income.
247. Lowry, supra note 243, at 21.
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taxpayers due to the issuance of the credit. Consider in addition that the tax
burden of DSTs is shifted directly to consumers (e.g. the Amazon FR and UK
seller announcements), which still does not alleviate the tax gap between digital
and non-digital businesses. A multilateral agreement is therefore important to
increase tax certainty and alleviate double taxation or double non-taxation.248
Also note that Pillar One is drafted as a standalone rule applying on top of the
existing PE norm. If a jurisdiction does not withdraw a unilateral DST measure,
the risk of multiple taxation is intensified when Pillar One is implemented.
D. Reaction to DSTs
Unilateral DSTs have become popular yet controversial. The OECD
considers DSTs as uncoordinated unilateral tax measures that “undermine the
relevance and sustainability of the international tax framework.”249 The OECD
has expressed the need to deliver a solution that would prevent “aggressive
unilateral measures” given the intense political pressure to tax highly digitalized
MNEs.250 DSTs have been emphatically opposed by U.S. officials, who view
them as discriminatory measures against U.S.-based companies and a deviation
from traditional tax principles.251 The predominance of unilateral DSTs is one of
the most significant challenges facing the OECD in achieving an agreement on
multilateral tax reform.
As noted, DSTs have been critiqued as discriminatory taxes that almost
exclusively target U.S.-based companies252 while undermining international tax
principles and coordinated multilateral efforts.253 DSTs apply only to large
digital companies, due to their high global revenue thresholds. Under most DST
regimes, only companies exceeding annual global revenue of €750 million are
subject to the tax. As a result, DSTs apply primarily to U.S-based digital
companies.254
According to a 2017 UN report, two-thirds of digital MNEs were
headquartered in the U.S.255 In 2019, Forbes estimated that eight of the ten
world’s largest internet companies were U.S.-based.256 Of Forbes’ Top 100 list,
248. OECD, Programme of Work to Develop a Consensus Solution to the Tax Challenges Arising
from the Digitalisation of the Economy, at 20 (2019), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/programme-of-
work-to-develop-a-consensus-solution-to-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-
economy.pdf; OECD, supra note 110, at 10.
249. The OECD also provides that DSTs will harm global investment and growth. See OECD,
supra note 110, at 4.
250. Id.
251. U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 230, at 31, 55; CNBC Television, Breaking:
President Trump responds to France’s tax on American companies, might impose wine tax, (Jul. 26,
2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JKiTwIvPv4Q (President Trump speaking in response to the
French DST); H.R.Res. 1097, 116th Congress (2020) (Rep. Ronald Estes sponsored the resolution).
252. Mason & Parada, supra note 241, at 1185-93.
253. OECD, supra note 110, at 4.
254. The EC Commission Impact Assessment expressed that “large digital multinationals are
particularly concentrated in the United States.” See 2018 EC Impact Assessment, supra note 200, at 113.
255. These statistics are provided in a 2017 United Nations study on investment and the digital
economy. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2017: Investment
and the Digital Economy, at 174, UNCTAD/WIR/2017 (2017).
256. The Forbes Top 100 list, current as of September 29, 2019, examined the most recent sales,
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nine companies were headquartered in China,257 reflecting the dominance of the
U.S. and China in the digital economy.258 Recall that as of December 2019, the
world’s five largest companies by market capitalization were Apple, Microsoft,
Amazon, Alphabet (Google), and Facebook, in relevant order.259 All are U.S.-
based digital companies that have significant commercial activity in markets
outside the U.S. These companies collect and market user data, and offer digital
intermediary platforms and online advertising. DSTs are tailored to capture
companies of this scale (over €750 million in revenues) that engage in digital
services activities in market jurisdictions. Mainstream media has often referred
to unilateral DSTs as “Facebook taxes” or “Google taxes,”260 because DSTs
apply only to this subset of companies. French Minister of Economy and Finance
Bruno Le Maire has referred to the French DST as the “GAFA tax,” meaning the
“Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon tax.”261 The Government of France website
page announcing the outlines of the “GAFA” tax even features the logos of
Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon, as if indicating the companies subject to
the tax.262 Note that targeting U.S.-based companies conflicts with the
fundamental international tax principle of nondiscrimination, which provides
that the source country must not tax income in a manner that discriminates
against foreigners.263
The U.S. Trade Representative estimated that the French DST applies to
27 company groups, 17 of which are U.S.-based, including Google (Alphabet),
Apple, Facebook and Amazon. Only one French company, Criteo, would likely
be subject to the French DST.264 According to a 2017 study by Gary Clyde
Hufbauer and Zhiyao (Lucy) Lu, an EU-wide DST would apply only to U.S.-
based digital firms, except for Spotify.265 The policy of targeting large U.S.-
profits, assets, and market capitalization of large internet companies. Note that Internet companies are
companies that generally conduct most of their business on the internet, exclusive of internet service
providers or other information technology companies. See Forbes 2019 Ranking, supra note 23; Greater
China Ranks No. 2 On New Forbes Digital 100 List, FORBES, Oct. 10, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/
sites/forbeschina/2019/10/10/greater-china-ranks-no-2-on-new-forbes-digital-100-list/?sh=2f0e61666fae.
257. See Forbes 2019 Ranking, supra note 23.
258. Note that according to Forbes, three additional companies were headquartered in Hong
Kong, and two more in Taiwan.
259. NASDAQ Stock Screener, supra note 22.
260. See, e.g., Russia Moves Closer to New Google Tax, , , ,
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/10/03/russia-moves-closer-to-new-google-tax-a67571; Rhonda
Richford,France Passes Controversial Google, Facebook Tax, , u , ,
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/france-passes-controversial-google-facebook-tax-1223782;
Ana Garcia Valdivia, Spain To Push Ahead With ‘Google Tax’ Despite U.S. Tariffs Threat, ,
9, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/anagarciavaldivia/2019/12/09/spain-to-push-ahead-with-google-
tax-despite-the-us-reprisals.
261. Gov’t of France, Taxation: the outlines of the GAFA tax revealed, GOUVERNEMENT (Mar.
6, 2019), https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/taxation-the-outlines-of-the-gafa-tax-revealed.
262. Id.
263. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law, ,
(2004); Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. International Taxation,
1, 1068 (1997).
264. The full list of U.S. companies expected to be subject to the France DST is: Apple, Facebook
and Amazon, Airbnb, Booking, eBay, Expedia, Groupon, Match Group (Tinder), Microsoft, Sabre,
Snapchat, Twitter, Uber, Verizon, ContextLogic (Wish). See U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 230,
at 26.
265. Hufbauer & Lu, supra note 241 at 6. Recall that Spotify is domiciled in Luxemburg and
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based companies recalls one of the most famous tax aphorisms, articulated by
the late U.S. Senator Russell Long: “Tax reform means don’t tax you, don’t tax
me, tax that fellow behind the tree!”266 In the case of DSTs, Google, Amazon,
Facebook and Apple are that fellow behind the tree.
Scholars have critiqued the U.S.-targeted application of DSTs as a harmful
and intellectually indefensible267 move that at most amounts to a mercantilist
ring-fencing of the digital economy.268 The OECD has also stated that because
the digital economy is increasingly becoming the economy itself, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to ring-fence the digital economy for tax
purposes.”269 The OECD explains that attempting to isolate the digital economy
as a separate sector inevitably requires drawing arbitrary lines between what is
digital and what is not.270 While the OECD’s Pillar One scope purports to go
beyond highly digitalized business models, DSTs narrowly apply to a subset of
digital services activities.
Unilateral DSTs have encountered political scrutiny from R&D exporting
countries and digital technology hubs. In June 2019, the Ministers of Finance of
Sweden, Denmark and Finland presented a joint statement endorsing global
cooperation on digital taxation within the OECD while opposing unilateral
DSTs.271 The Finance Ministers stated that DSTs deviate from internationally
established tax principles by taxing gross income regardless of whether an
enterprise is profitable.272 The Finance Ministers conveyed that such substantial
changes to current tax principles need to be discussed and agreed upon at an
international level.273 The Irish Parliament has also opposed DSTs, stating that
there is no single definition of what constitutes the digital economy and that a
DST is a narrow solution to reforming the PE concept.274 The People’s Republic
of China, home to many large MNEs including two of the world’s largest digital
companies—Alibaba and Tencent—is a main target of DSTs, along with the
headquartered in Sweden.
266. William B. Mead, Congress Tackles the Income Tax, , u , uoting Sen.
Long).
267. Grinberg, supra note 28, at 87 (calling DSTs intellectually indefensible); Mason & Parada,
supra note 241, at 1185-86 (expressing that DSTs are discriminatory). Some scholars have defended
DSTs, with the notion that DSTs need to be understood as allowing the country where a “rent” is located
to tax the rent. See, e.g., Wei Cui, The Digital Services Tax: A Conceptual Defense,
(forthcoming).
268. Grinberg, supra note 28, at 87.
269. OECD, supra note 5, at 11.
270. Id. at 54.
271. Global cooperation is key to address tax challenges from digitalization, MINISTRY OF
FINANCE, GOVERNMENT OFFICES OF SWEDEN (June 1, 2018), https://www.government.se/statements/
2018/06/global-cooperation-is-key-to-address-tax-challenges-from-digitalization/.
272. DSTs do not consider the losses of an MNE group.
273. Despite issuing the joint statement, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen stated that
Denmark would support an EU-wide agreement on taxing digital services if a global agreement will fail
on an OECD level. According to Frederiksen, Denmark did not support an EU-wide digital tax in the past
but does now. See Morten Buttler, Denmark Supports EU-Wide Deal on Digital Tax, Premier Says,
, , , oo o -01-28/frederiksen-says-
denmark-supports-eu-wide-deal-on-digital-tax.
274. Houses of the Oireachtas, Joint Comm. On Fin., Pub. Expenditure and Reform and Tax’n,
Reasoned Opinion on COM (2018) 147 and 148, at 4 (May 22, 2018).
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U.S.275 Whereas China will be harshly affected by the DSTs, it has been mostly
silent in the digital tax debate and has not voiced a notable public position on the
matter.276 Nevertheless, in December 2020, China reportedly considered
imposing a digital tax on technology companies that hold user data.277
The U.S., home to most of the world’s largest digital technology
companies, is the most dominant opponent of DSTs and has led the battle against
their implementation. The U.S. wishes to protect U.S.-based companies from
foreign tax liability, and most importantly, protect its own taxable revenue from
foreign hands.278 Former House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Kevin
Brady has stated that DSTs are a blatant revenue grab inconsistent with
international norms.279 U.S. Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary for
International Tax Affairs under the Trump administration, Chip Harter,
expressed that DSTs are “ill conceived” and that the U.S. opposes any DST
proposal.280 This position has been echoed by SecretaryMnuchin, who has stated
that the U.S. “firmly opposes digital services taxes because they have a
discriminatory impact on U.S.-based businesses and are inconsistent with the
architecture of current international tax rules.”281 Mnuchin also asserted that
DSTs threaten the longstanding multilateral consensus on international
taxation.282 U.S. Senate Finance Committee Chair Charles E. Grassley and
ranking member Ron Wyden have also condemned unilateral actions,283 with
Wyden stating that a post-Brexit trade agreement with the U.S. will not happen
if a U.K. DST is in place.284 In September 2020, Rep. Ronald Estes (R-KS)
introduced a House resolution strongly opposing the imposition of DSTs that
“discriminate against United States companies.”285 The resolution calls on
275. Peter A. Barnes & H. David Rosenbloom, Digital Services Taxes: How Did We Get Into
This Mess?, INT’L 1255, 1256 (2020).
276. China’s silence on the subject as well as its interest in protecting the revenue of its MNEs
could suggest that it does not endorse unilateral DSTs. Yue “Daisy” Dai, China’s Surprising Silence on
Digital Taxation, INT’L 1301, 1301 (2019).
277. Cheng Leng & Brenda Goh, China regulator says should consider digital data tax for tech
firms, REUTERS, Dec. 16, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-tech-taxation/china-regulator-
says-should-consider-digital-data-tax-for-tech-firms-idINKBN28Q10Z. The report cited Yao Qian,
science and technology supervision bureau chief at the China Securities Regulatory Commission.
278. See CNBC Television, Breaking: President Trump responds to France’s tax on American
companies, might impose wine tax, (Jul. 26, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JKiTwIvPv4Q.
President Trump commented that France’s DST on U.S. companies was the “wrong thing to do,” and that
“we [the U.S.] tax our companies, they [France] don’t tax our companies.” Trump threatened to impose a
punitive tax on French wine because of the DST.
279. Press Release, Brady Statement on U.K. Tax on Digital Services, COMMITTEE ON WAYS
ANDMEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Oct. 31, 2018).
280. Hazma Ali, U.S. Weighs Trade Action Over French Digital Tax, Official Says,
, , , oo o -tax-report-international/u-s-weighs-trade-
action-over-french-digital-tax-official-says.
281. Steven Mnuchin Letter to Gurría, supra note 157.
282. Id.
283. Letter from Chair Charles E. Grassley and Ranking Member Ron Wyden to U.S. Secretary
Treasury Steven Mnuchin (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-
wyden-reaffirm-support-treasury-engagement-oecd-process-addressing-tax.
284. Jad Chamseddine, Lawmakers Warn of Effect of Digital Services Tax on Trade Pacts, TAX
NOTES TODAY INT’L, July 12, 2019, https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-international/digital-
economy/lawmakers-warn-effect-digital-services-tax-trade-pacts/2019/07/12/29qlj.
285. H.R. Res.1097, supra note 251.
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countries to withdraw and refrain from DSTs, and on U.S. Government agencies
to protect U.S. companies “from the discriminatory effects of DSTs.”286
E. U.S. Retaliation and Section 301 Investigations
Among the most widely publicized controversies in the international tax
realm has been the U.S.-France dispute over the French DST. As a response to
the French legislation, U.S President Donald Trump ordered Trade
Representative Robert Lighthizer (USTR) to initiate a Section 301 Investigation
into France’s DST. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the President
of the U.S. to take all appropriate action, including tariff-based retaliation, to
remove any act, policy, or practice of a foreign government that violates an
international trade agreement or is unjustified, unreasonable, or discriminatory,
and that burdens or restricts U.S. commerce.287 Section 301 is a unilateral action
by the U.S. government that does not rely on the dispute settlement system of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) or its stipulated timeline.288 Since the
WTO’s establishment in 1995, the U.S. has primarily used Section 301 to pursue
dispute settlement through the WTO. More recently under the Trump
administration, the U.S. has relied more heavily on Section 301 as a unilateral
measure to promote what the administration perceives as fair trade and to
eliminate discriminatory practices against U.S.-based companies.289
This Section 301 Investigation was directed to investigate the effects of the
French DST “and determine whether it is discriminatory or unreasonable and
burdens or restricts United States commerce.”290 The December 2, 2019, USTR
report on France’s DST found that “France’s DST discriminates against U.S.
companies and is inconsistent with prevailing principles of tax policy and
unusually burdensome for affected U.S. companies.”291 Recall that the USTR
estimates that 17 of 27 of the companies subject to the French DST are U.S.-
286. Id.
287. Trade Act of 1974, Pub.L. No. 93-618; 19 U.S.C. § 2411.
288. According to the WTO, “Dispute settlement is the central pillar of the multilateral trading
system.” WTO members have agreed that if they believe fellow-members are violating trade rules, they
will use the multilateral system of settling disputes instead of acting unilaterally. For more on the WTO’s
multilateral system of settling disputes, including timelines, see Understanding the WTO: Settling
Disputes, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm.
289. Andres B. Schwarzenberg, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Origin, Evolution, and
Use, at 1, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R46604 (Dec. 14, 2020). Note that under the Trump Administration, the
USTR has initiated Section 301 Investigations against China (on technology transfers and IP), the EU (on
large civil aircraft), the EU (on the beef industry), Vietnam (import and use of illegal timber), France’s
DST, and the DST of 10 trading partners. See Section 301 Investigations, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section-301-investigations/.
290. U.S. Trade Representative, Press Release: USTR Announces Initiation of Section 301
Investigation into France’s Digital Services Tax (July 10, 2019). The USTR held a public hearing on
August 19, 2019, where ten witnesses testified and responded to questions from the interagency Section
301 committee. Witnesses included representatives of large U.S.-based digital companies such as
Amazon, Google, and Facebook. Testimonies expressed concern regarding the French DST, and conveyed
support of the U.S. initiative to conduct the investigation. See USTR Public Hearing, supra note 235, at
47-61.
291. U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 230, at 1. The report detailed that the DST applies
retroactively, applies to gross revenue rather than income thereby not accounting for losses, and that
international tax principles require a significant territorial nexus for companies to fall within a country’s
corporate tax jurisdiction. Id. at 30-62.
90 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 46: 57
based.292 On July 10, 2020, the USTR decided to take action in the form of an
additional 25% tariff on products of France.293 The new tariff applies to 21
subheadings with an estimated trade value of approximately $1.3 billion of
French goods294 which include handbags, soaps, and make-up preparations.295
The result of the investigation demonstrates the potential for “tax wars” between
competing jurisdictions.296 In this battle, a tax imposed by France on U.S.-based
digital MNEs led to a punitive tax on French goods by the U.S.
The USTR’s probe into unilateral DSTs did not end with France. In a June
2020 notice, the USTR announced that it has initiated a Section 301 Investigation
into the DSTs of ten U.S. trading partners:297 Austria, Brazil, the Czech
Republic, India, Indonesia, Italy, Spain, Turkey, the U.K., and the EU.298 The
announcement conveyed the U.S.’ determined position that DSTs are hostile
measures that discriminate against U.S.-based companies. In January 2021, the
USTR found that the DSTs of India, Italy, Turkey, Austria, Spain, and the U.K.
discriminate against U.S. digital services companies.299 The growing wave of
unilateral measures along with U.S. resistance to DSTs will exacerbate these
conflicts and contribute to the ongoing tax wars over taxable revenues,
particularly as economies struggle to financially recover from the COVID-19
crisis.
VI. U.N. PROPOSAL
In August 2020, the U.N. Tax Committee released its own proposal on the
tax treatment of payments for digital services.300 The proposal is a draft of a new
article 12B that would be added to the U.N. Model Taxation Convention301
which has been developed by a drafting group from thirteen developing States.302
292. Id. at 26-27.
293. Note that collection of the duties has been suspended in light of the ongoing investigation
of similar DSTs. The USTR plans to issue a coordinated response in all of the ongoing DST investigations.
U.S. Trade Representative, Press Release: Suspension of Tariff Action in France Digital Services Tax
Investigation (Jan. 7, 2021), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/
january/suspension-tariff-action-france-digital-services-tax-investigation.
294. Notice of Action Pursuant to Section 301, 85 Fed. Re. 137,43293 (July 10, 2020).
295. For a full list of the products subject to the added duties, see id. at annex B.
296. Mason & Parada, supra note 241, at 1183.
297. U.S. Trade Representative, Press Release: USTR Initiates Section 301 Investigations of
Digital Services Taxes (June 2, 2020).
298. U.S. Trade Representative, Initiation of Section 301 Investigations of Digital Services Taxes,
at 1-4, USTR-2020-0022 (June 2, 2020).
299. U.S. Trade Representative, Report on India’s Digital Services Tax, at 13 (Jan. 6, 2021); U.S.
Trade Representative, Report on Italy's Digital Services Tax, at 14 (Jan. 6, 2021); U.S. Trade
Representative, Report on Turkey’s Digital Services Tax, at 14 (Jan. 6, 2021); U.S. Trade Representative,
Report on Austria's Digital Services Tax, at 11 (Jan. 14, 2021); U.S. Trade Representative, Report on
Spain's Digital Services Tax, at 13 (Jan. 14, 2021); U.S. Trade Representative, Report on the United
Kingdom’s Digital Services Tax, at 13 (Jan. 14, 2021).
300. U.N., Drafting Group Proposal: Possible Tax Treaty, Provision on Payments for Digital
Services (Aug. 2020), https://www.un.org/development/desa/financing/sites/www.un.org.development.
desa.financing/files/2020-08/TAX%20TREATY%20PROVISION%20ON%20PAYMENTS%20FOR%
20DIGITAL%20SERVICES.pdf [hereinafter Drafting Group Proposal].
301. Id. at 1.
302. U.N. Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, Drafting Group
Cover Note for Digitalized Economy: 20th Session (July 21, 2020), https://www.un.org/
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The U.N. released a revised draft of the new article 12B in October 2020.303
Similar to the OECD’s Pillar One, the U.N. Proposal provides source countries
a new taxing right with respect to automated digital services. In contrast with the
OECD approach, the U.N. Proposal would take the form of a gross (rather than
net) income tax in which a jurisdiction would have taxing rights over a
percentage of in-scope revenues.304
According to the U.N. Proposal, liable companies can elect to pay the
article 12B tax either through withholdings on gross income, or through a net
income tax on their “qualified profits” from automated digital services at a rate
provided in the domestic law of the source State.305 “Qualified Profits” are
considered 30% of a company’s net income derived from automated digital
services.306 Moreover, the U.N. Proposal does not recommend a new nexus nor
does it require the application of thresholds,307 by so significantly differing from
Pillar One. According to the U.N. Proposal’s Commentary, the proposal intends
to benefit developing countries, who “have limited administrative capacity and
need a simple, reliable and efficient method to enforce tax imposed on income
from services derived by non-residents.”308 The U.N. Proposal acknowledges the
progress of the OECD BEPS Project and perceives new article 12B as a
mechanism that works within present international tax principles (without setting
forth principled reform).309 Article 12B would be adopted into the U.N. Model
Tax Convention and into tax treaties as a safeguard against BEPS that is
administered by developing countries.
VII. DIGITAL TAXATION AND COVID-19
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on the world
economy. According to World Bank projections, “the COVID-19 global
recession will be the deepest since the end of World War II, with the largest
fraction of economies experiencing declines in per capita output since 1870.”310
The World Bank estimates that the global economy contracted by 4.3% in 2020
because of the COVID-19 crisis.311 U.S. GDP in 2020 is estimated to have
declined by 3.6%,312 while the EU economy will condense without complete
development/desa/financing/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.financing/files/2020-08/
Cover%20Note.pdf [Drafting Group Cover Note].
303. U.N. Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in TaxMatters, Tax Consequences
of the digitalized economy: issues of relevance for developing countries, at annex 1, U.N. Doc.
E/C.18/2020/CRP.41 (Oct. 10, 2020) [Committee Report].
304. Drafting Group Proposal, supra note 300, at 1.
305. Committee Report, supra note 303, at Commentary, at 11.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 11-12.
308. Id. at 11.
309. Drafting Group Proposal, supra note 300, at Commentary, ¶¶ 1-2.
310. World Bank, Global Economic Prospects: June 2020, at 13 (Jun. 2020),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/33748/9781464815539.pdf?sequence=21
&isAllowed=y.
311. World Bank, Global Economic Prospects: January 2021, at 3 (Jan. 2020),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/34710/9781464816123.pdf.
312. Unemployment Statistics, EUROSTAT (last accessed Sep. 2020),
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Unemployment_statistics.
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immediate recovery.313 Governments have struggled to cope with the loss of
economic growth and financial toll of COVID-19 while searching for new
sources of revenue to recoup immense losses. An April 2020 communication
from the EC to the European Parliament was appropriately titled: “Using every
available euro in every way possible to protect lives and livelihoods.”314 Taxing
large digital MNEs may be an attractive path to attain such goals.
Through the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, the OECD has remained
committed to its goal of achieving a timely consensus-based multilateral
solution. The U.S.’ reluctance to agree to Pillar One and the growing number of
unilateral actions have been obstacles to accomplishing these plans.315 Pascal
Saint-Amans, director of the OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration,
has expressed that reaching an agreement on a global consensus-based solution
is becoming increasingly urgent as the number of governments considering
unilateral measures continues to rise.316 The OECD stated that its Secretariat
team is working “full steam” on the digital tax project, with meetings held
remotely due to the COVID-19 health crisis.317 The Inclusive Framework has
continued its work and negotiations have proceeded through the pandemic,318
although the timeline of reaching a political agreement has been postponed from
2020 to 2021.319
Several G20 finance ministers have communicated the need to proceed
with the international tax reform agenda. German finance minister Olaf Scholz
has stated that it is important, even in a time of a global crisis, to end profit
shifting and tax avoidance.320 Scholtz elaborated that Pillars One and Twowould
build a smarter and fairer global corporate tax framework to support the long-
term economic recovery fromCOVID-19.321 Saudi finance minister Mohammed
313. European Commission, Spring 2020 Economic Forecast (May 6, 2020),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-finance/ip125_en.pdf.
314. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the European Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,
Coronavirus Response: Using every available euro in every way possible to protect lives and livelihoods,
COM (2020) 143 final (Apr. 2, 2020).
315. Recall that the EU has vowed to push ahead with EU-wide action in the event that OECD
negotiations fail. See Margrethe Vestager, supra note 215. Meanwhile, several countries, including
Belgium and Brazil, have proceeded to propose unilateral DSTs in the midst of the pandemic. See La
Chambre, Proposition de loi relative à la création d’une taxe provisoire (TSN) portant sur les produits
générés par certaines activités des géants du numérique (May 29, 2020) (for the Belgian DST proposal);
Câmara dos Deputados, PL 2358/2020, Institui a Contribuição de Intervenção no Domínio Econômico
incidente sobre a receita bruta de serviços digitais prestados pelas grandes empresas de tecnologia (May
4, 2020) (for the Brazilian DST proposal).
316. Pascal Saint-Amans, The economy has changes, so must the tax, ,
5, 2020, https://www.businessandindustry.co.uk/tax/the-economy-has-changes-so-must-the-tax/.
317. OECD, Coronavirus (Covid-19): Update on OECD tax work (Mar. 17, 2020),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/coronavirus-covid-19-update-on-oecd-tax-work.htm.
318. Id.
319. European Parliament, ECON Committee Meeting, https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/
en/econ-committee-meeting_20200713-1545-COMMITTEE-ECON_vd, Pascal Saint-Amans, at
16:31:05 (July 13, 2020); OECD, supra note 94.
320. Global Solutions: The World Policy Forum, Global minimum taxation and the international
solution for taxation of the digital economy, (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.global-solutions-
initiative.org/global-table/fighting-inequality-through-progressive-taxation/.
321. Id.
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Al-Jadaan also described that international tax reform “is actually more relevant
today than before, as countries start to recover from the crisis and start to think
about means to ensure that they repay their debts; that they manage their debt to
GDP; that they think about fiscal levers they have… So fixing this is actually
essential.”322 Note that COVID-19 has accelerated rather than hindered the
growth of the digital economy because consumers increasingly rely on digital
consumption and many employees worldwide are working from home.323 The
OECD has also expressed that tax policy can contribute to covering the costs
incurred by governments dealing with the COVID-19 crisis.324
The OECD’s plans have also been challenged by the U.S.’ stern position
against fundamental international tax reform. U.S. officials, including Secretary
Mnuchin, have opposed Pillar One while expressing the need to focus on the
COVID-19 crisis.325 Meanwhile, the U.S. continues to oppose DSTs and intends
to retaliate if countries adopt unilateral measures.326 The U.S. has also advocated
shifting the multilateral solution on international tax reform to 2021 due to the
COVID-19 crisis and the 2020 U.S. presidential election, which has become the
present timeline.327
The U.S.’ call to delay the OECD tax reform was unsurprising considering
its reluctance to depart from traditional tax norms and its opposition to measures
that target U.S.-based MNEs.328 The U.S. is motivated to at least stall the
international tax reform process in light of these interests.329 The unwillingness
322. International Monetary Fund World Bank Group: Spring Meetings 2020, Press Briefing:
Group of Twenty (G20), at 40:10 (Apr. 15, 2020), https://meetings.imf.org/en/2020/Spring/Schedule/
2020/04/15/press-briefing-g20.
323. Dave Reinsel, John Rydning & John F. Gantz, Worldwide Global DataSphere Forecast,
2020-2024: The COVID-19 Data Bump and the Future of Data Growth, at abstract, INT’L DATA
CORPORATION (Apr. 2020).
324. OECD, Tax and Fiscal Policy in Response to the Coronavirus Crisis: Strengthening
Confidence and Resilience, at 6 (Apr. 15, 2020), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=128_128575-
o6raktc0aa&title=Tax-and-Fiscal-Policy-in-Response-to-the-Coronavirus-Crisis. The report states that
work on Pillars One and Two has progressed in spite of the disruption due to the COVID-19 health crisis.
325. Steven Mnuchin Letter to Finance Ministers, supra note 161.
326. Id.
327. See Schultz, supra note 164; OECD, supra note 94, at 9.
328. Recall that the U.S. originally favored implementing Pillar One solely as an optional “safe-
harbor,” to the dismay of the OECD. See Steven Mnuchin Letter to Gurría, supra note 157.
329. Note that a few other entities have also called to delay the OECD tax reform due to the
COVID-19 crisis. The United States Council for International Business wrote a letter to Secretary
Mnuchin recommending postponing the OECD’s workstream on taxation of the digital economy for at
least six months so that governments and taxpayers channel their resources towards addressing the
COVID-19 crisis. See Letter from the United States Council for International Business to U.S. Secretary
of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin (March 23, 2020), https://www.uscib.org/uscib-
content/uploads/2020/03/Treasury-letter-3_23_2020.pdf. The National Foreign Trade Council wrote a
letter to Secretary Mnuchin expressing that the OECD’s proposals can be negotiated at an “appropriate
time in the future, and that the OECD needs to use its international tax policy expertise to help mitigate
the economic damage of the pandemic.” See Letter from the National Foreign Trade Council to U.S.
Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin (Mar. 27, 2020), http://www.nftc.org/default/Tax%
20Policy/NFTC%20letter%20on%20OECD%20tax%20policy%20work%20during%20the%20pandemi
c%20March20.pdf. The Federation of German Industries (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie) called
on the OECD to postpone the deadline of its digital agenda, stating that “it would be unreasonable to stick
to the ambitious timetable to reach a political agreement.” See BDI, COVID-19: Tax measures to tackle
the impact of COVID-19 (April 1, 2020), https://english.bdi.eu/publication/news/covid-19/. Note that all
of the abovementioned entities have stated that obtaining an OECD consensus is a critical goal, and that
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to agree to reforming international tax norms may be detrimental to global
reform efforts and will continue to trigger tax wars if no solution is achieved.330
Although the new Biden administration has expressed encouraging commitment
to the OECD negotiations, core U.S. interests have not changed. If the U.S.
persistently resists global tax reform, it may find itself alone in a world
dominated by unilateral DSTs that target its digital companies.331 In the present
state of affairs, Pillar One may be the best-case scenario for the U.S. because it
would allocate only a residual amount of non-routine profits to market
jurisdictions. Unilateral DSTs are the worst-case scenario because they ring-
fence the digital economy and explicitly target U.S.-based companies. Achieving
a multilateral solution through the Inclusive Framework is the optimal way to
prevent unilateral measures and to promote repealing existing DSTs.332 Without
a multilateral framework, the U.S. may be prompted to investigate more of its
trade partners and to retaliate against discriminatory taxes. The COVID-19 crisis
makes unilateral measures greatly appealing, and several jurisdictions, including
the EU, intend to enact unilateral measures if the OECD cannot produce a
consensus-based solution.333 The U.S. ought to advance Pillar One and
encourage a timely multilateral agreement to avoid a reality where unilateral
DSTs become the international tax norm.334
delaying the OECD deadline should not lead to implementing unilateral DSTs.
330. An outcome described by OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría. See OECD Secretary-
General,Meeting of the Inclusive Framework on BEPS: Opening Remarks by Angel Gurría (July 1, 2020),
https://www.oecd.org/about/secretary-general/meeting-of-the-inclusive-framework-on-beps-july-2020.
htm.
331. An outcome that may force the U.S. to enact punitive measures against every jurisdiction
that enacts a DST.
332. Note that several administrations have agreed to withdraw or reevaluate their DSTs in the
aftermath of an OECD-led multilateral consensus. This includes the French Digital Tax Bill. See
u o , , , o u o status/1116630545998311
431(stating that “once we have a global consensus, France will withdraw its national tax”); Austrian
Digital Tax Act, supra note 206 at Sec. 8(2).
333. 2020 EC Communication, supra note 212, at 15.
334. Besides the encouraging statement by Secretary Yellen, it is still not entirely clear to what
extent a Joe Biden-led presidential administration will change the U.S. position with respect to negotiating
the global tax reform. President Biden has not explicitly addressed the subject of digital taxation in his
proposed tax plans, although his plan would generally increase income taxes on corporations. Biden
intends to increase the corporate tax rate to 28%, and establish a 10% offshoring penalty surtax on overseas
production by U.S. companies for sales back to the U.S. See The Biden-Harris Plan to Fight for Workers
by Delivering on Buy America and Make it in America, JOE BIDEN FOR PRESIDENT,
https://joebiden.com/the-biden-harris-plan-to-fight-for-workers-by-delivering-on-buy-america-and-
make-it-in-america/#; Gordon B. Mermin, Surachai Khitatrakun, Chenxi Lu, Thornton Matheson &
Jeffrey Rohaly, An Analysis of Former Vice President Biden’s Tax Proposals, at 1, Tax Policy Center
(Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/publication/158624/An_
Analysis_of_Former_Vice_President_Bidens_Tax_Proposals_1_2.pdf. Biden has stated that “Amazon
should start paying their taxes. I don’t think any company . . . should absolutely be in a position where
they pay no taxes and make billions and billions and billions of dollars.” This likely refers to Amazon’s
domestic, rather than international tax liability. See CNBC Television, Former Vice President Joe Biden:
‘Amazon should start paying their taxes,’, at 1:52 (May 22, 2020), youtube.com/watch?v=ApVl_P40egk.
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VIII. NEW NEXUS PROPOSAL
A. Eliminating the Global Revenue Threshold
Market jurisdictions are eager to reform international tax norms and to tax
revenues of MNEs irrespective of physical presence in their jurisdictions. On the
opposite end, the U.S. is reluctant to depart from current international tax norms
in the interest of protecting its companies and its own tax receipts. A global
consensus is important to prevent international tax wars and to ensure that profits
are attributed to jurisdictions in which they are earned. A multilateral solution is
particularly significant in an economic environment where physical presence
does not necessarily indicate economic activity.
This section proposes adopting the OECD’s Pillar One approach, while
modifying its threshold-based application incorporated in Amount A.335 The
proposal can be summarized as follows: (1) Eliminating the global revenue
threshold (€750 million); (2) Applying tax nexus based on market thresholds; (3)
Establishing a de minimis amount for market thresholds. Such a multilateral
approach would be more equitable, preserving the core Pillar One elements
sought by the Inclusive Framework while eliminating a global revenue threshold
that targets U.S.-based companies.
A notable similarity between the OECD’s Pillar One and unilateral DSTs
is that both apply a new taxing right subject to satisfying two cumulative
thresholds. The first is a size-limiting global revenue threshold that corresponds
to an MNE’s annual consolidated gross revenues. An MNE is subject to the tax
only if it exceeds annual revenues in this amount. The OECD’s Pillar One
suggests a €750 million threshold or greater,336 and unilateral DSTs have largely
established similar threshold ranges. These global revenue thresholds apply the
new tax only to a select group of exceptionally large MNEs.
The second threshold is a market threshold, providing that tax nexus would
exist only if an MNE exceeds specified revenues or sales in the market
jurisdiction.337 The market threshold indicates the MNE’s substantial
involvement in the economy of the market jurisdiction, not dependent on
physical presence. Market revenue thresholds in unilateral DSTs vary widely,
from €3 million in Spain338 to £25 million in the U.K as an example.339 The
OECD has noted that such a threshold could be adjusted to the size of the market,
and to ensure the benefit also reaches smaller jurisdictions and developing
economies.340
335. Recall that according to Pillar One, a new taxing right is allocated to market jurisdictions
through new nexus and profit allocation rules. The new nexus rule would apply in all cases where a
business has a sustained and significant involvement in the economy of a market jurisdiction and would
be based on global revenue and market thresholds. See OECD, supra note 94, at 12-15; OECD, supra
note 110, at 5, 7-8.
336. OECD, supra note 94, at 62.
337. The nexus would apply irrespective of physical presence in the market jurisdiction.
338. Spanish Digital Services Tax, supra note 206.
339. HMRC Digital Services Tax, supra note 206.
340. OECD, supra note 94, at 65.
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This section proposes implementing a multilateral approach without global
revenue thresholds and applying the new tax nexus based on market thresholds.
Furthermore, it proposes that the market thresholds would be subject to a global
de minimis amount determined at the OECD level. Relying on market thresholds
will correct significant flaws of Pillar One while maintaining the autonomy of
tax administrations within a multilateral solution.
A €750 million global revenue threshold (or greater) significantly narrows
the scope of any approach that aims to provide a long-term solution to the tax
challenges of digitalization. Global revenue thresholds profoundly limit Pillar
One and apply the new tax only to a small subset of businesses. With a global
revenue threshold, the Pillar One outcome would not substantially differ from a
DST because both would only target extremely large and mostly U.S.-based
MNEs. In addition, a size-limitation narrows the base of the new tax while
triggering an undesired “cliff” effect for companies falling just in or out of the
threshold.341 Cliff effects in income taxation have been frequently criticized by
legal scholars because they arbitrarily leave taxpayers in worse economic
positions than if they had earned less revenue.342 For example, consider a 3% tax
applying to MNE groups exceeding €750 million of annual revenues. This tax
leaves a company with €751 million of annual revenues worse off than a
company with €749 million of annual revenues, because only the former is
subject to the tax. In fact, because a company earning €751 million of annual
revenues would be liable to pay €22.53 million in taxes (under a 3% DST), it
would be worse off post-tax than any company earning between €727.47 million
and €750 million of annual revenues.343 Such cliffs contravene vertical equity
because the higher-earning taxpayer would be left in a worse economic position
post-tax than the lower-income taxpayer.344 The global revenue threshold is not
progressive, and this unfair result would stimulate tax planning and income
distortions to avoid the tax liabilities created by the cliff.
Furthermore, the global revenue threshold does not indicate significant and
sustained involvement in the economy of a market jurisdiction. Substantial
involvement is indicated solely through the market threshold. The global revenue
threshold serves only to target exceptionally large companies, preventing the
implementation of equitable international tax reform.345 The examples below
341. The Pillar One Blueprint recognizes the problematic nature created by a “cliff-edge” effect
of a single threshold. This issue, however, is emphasized with respect to the development of a domestic
business exemption in determining the fixed return for the marketing and distribution safe harbor, and not
when considering the €750 million global revenue threshold. Id. at 135-137.
342. See Manoj Viswanathan, The Hidden Costs of Cliff Effects in the Internal Revenue Code,
, -956 (2016); Harry Grubert & Rosanne Altshuler, Fixing the System: An
Analysis of Alternative Proposals for the Reform of International Tax, ,
708-09 (Sept. 2013).
343. For the purposes of this example, disregard the application of a market threshold.
344. Viswanathan, supra note 343, at 955-56.
345. Pillar One provides that setting a threshold below €750 million would lead to substantial
compliance burdens for both private companies and tax administrations, without matching benefits in
profit reallocations. See OECD, supra note 94, at 22, 62. The OECD does not address whether there is a
material difference between a €750 million-earning company, and a company earning slightly less (other
than reporting requirements). The OECD also does not address whether there are possible violations of
nondiscrimination and vertical equity.
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illustrate the flaws of the global revenue threshold, and the advantage of relying
on market thresholds to establish the new taxing right.346 In examples 1-3,
assume that the global revenue threshold, determined at an OECD level, is €750
million. Also assume that the market revenue threshold of Country F is €25
million. To be subject to the new tax in Country F, an MNE group must therefore
report annual revenues of at least €750 million, and at least €25 million of
revenues in Country F. If both thresholds are satisfied, a portion of the deemed
residual (non-routine) profits of the relevant MNE would be allocated toCountry
F. Assume also that all other Amount A criteria are met.
Example 1: DigitalCorp is a U.S.-based company that does not have a
physical presence in Country F. DigitalCorp reports €755 million in revenues
for the relevant financial year. DigitalCorp’s revenues in Country F are €28
million. DigitalCorp would be subject to the new tax in Country F, because it
meets both thresholds: the global revenue threshold (over €750 million) and the
market revenue threshold (over €25 million in Country F).347
Example 2: CompuCorp is a U.S.-based company that does not have a
physical presence in Country F. CompuCorp reports €2 billion in revenues for
the relevant financial year. CompuCorp’s revenues in Country F are €10 million.
CompuCorp would not be subject to the new tax in Country F because it does
not meet Country F’s market revenue threshold. This is despite CompuCorp’s
global revenues which significantly exceed both the OECD’s global revenue
threshold and DigitalCorp’s annual revenues. This result is sensible because
CompuCorp’s market activity in Country F does not rise to the deemed level of
substantial economic engagement that warrants tax liability irrespective of
physical presence. The scale of CompuCorp’s global revenues is irrelevant, as
long as it does not substantially engage in the economy of Country F. In this
example, CompuCorp does not meet Country F’s market threshold and is
therefore not deemed to be substantially engaged in its economy.348
Example 3: OnlineCorp is a U.S.-based company that does not have a
physical presence in Country F.OnlineCorp reports €600 million in revenues for
the relevant financial year. OnlineCorp’s revenues in Country F are €56 million.
Although OnlineCorp meets the market revenue threshold of Country F, it will
not be subject to the tax because its global revenues do not exceed the €750
million amount required by the global revenue threshold.349
The outcome of example 3 illustrates the unreasonable results under a
global revenue threshold. Even though OnlineCorp is clearly substantially
engaged in the economy of Country F, its business activities do not give rise to
tax liability because its annual global revenues do not exceed €750 million.
Compare the outcome of DigitalCorp in example 1 to OnlineCorp in example 3.
In example 1, DigitalCorp has tax liability in Country F because it satisfies both
thresholds, including the €25 million market threshold. In example 3, although
346. The examples were originally presented by the author in Assaf Harpaz, OECD Unified
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OnlineCorp earns double the revenues ofDigitalCorp in Country F (€56 million
versus €28 million), OnlineCorp is not subject to tax in Country F simply
because its global revenues do not exceed €750 million. This yields an irrational
outcome that does not allocate taxing rights based on an MNE’s substantial
involvement in the market jurisdiction.350
In example 3, OnlineCorp is significantly involved in the economy of
Country F and ought to incur a tax liability. However, it is saved by the €750
million global revenue threshold, which considerably narrows the tax base. The
size-limiting threshold does not necessarily indicate economic involvement in a
market jurisdiction, as shown in example 3. A global revenue threshold thus
creates an unwanted cliff effect, arbitrarily applies to a limited set of companies,
and fails to indicate substantial involvement in the economy of a market
jurisdiction. Eliminating the global revenue threshold would address the
legitimate discrimination concern voiced by the U.S., because a substantial
portion of digital MNEs targeted by a €750 million threshold are U.S.-based.
B. Relying on Market Thresholds
This Article recommends adopting a multilateral solution without a global
revenue threshold and suggests determining tax nexus based on market
thresholds. The new taxing right would thereby be assessed based on the revenue
of a foreign company in a particular market jurisdiction. The market threshold
would indicate sustained and significant involvement in the market jurisdiction,
with no regard for the size-limiting global revenue threshold. Consider several
elements that underline this proposal. First, market thresholds may be adjusted
to the size of the market: the larger the size of the market, the higher the degree
of involvement generally required to establish tax nexus. The market threshold
therefore ought to rise respectively with the size of the market jurisdiction.
Consider for example France and Estonia, both members of the OECD and the
Inclusive Framework. The population of France is 67 million,351 and its nominal
GDP is $2.8 trillion.352 Estonia’s population is only 1.3 million,353 and its GDP
is $32.7 billion.354 These broad differences could be reflected by adjusting the
market thresholds to match the size of the relative markets to be sensitive to GDP
and population.355
Second, market thresholds would be determined unilaterally on a country-
350. Several companies fall into the example 3 scenario. In the case of the French DST, this
includes streaming service Deezer. See U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 230, at 22-23.
351. Usually resident population on 1 January, EUROSTAT (Oct. 10, 2019) (EC), (under
“database,” “population and social conditions,” “population”), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database
[hereinafter Eurostat].
352. France: Gross domestic product, current prices, IMF World Economic Outlook Database
(2020).
353. Eurostat, supra note 352.
354. Estonia: Gross domestic product, current prices, IMF World Economic Outlook Database
(2020).
355. The OECD mentions the possibility of adjusting the market revenue threshold based on the
market’s GDP, but acknowledges that using this metric could add substantial complexity. See OECD,
supra note 94, at 67. GDP is one of several possible indicators that could be used to determine the market
threshold, which ought to be determined by the market.
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by-country basis, rather than on an OECD level. In so, this proposal provides
much greater jurisdictional autonomy than the proposed Pillar One. Applying a
threshold of deemed sustained and significant involvement is a decision best
made by independent tax administrations. A unilateral determination preserves
jurisdictional autonomy to implement and maintain independent taxing rules
within a larger multilateral approach. Tax administrations ought to be able to
perform calibrations to fit their market sizes and satisfy administrative needs.
The objective is to permit flexible application of an equitable threshold that could
encourage jurisdictions to withdraw DSTs in favor of the autonomy enabled by
the multilateral approach. Such leeway permits jurisdictions to select the size of
their tax base while eliminating the unwanted effects of the global revenue
threshold. A market threshold-based system would favor EUMember States and
other States which have enacted DST regimes seeking to collect tax revenue
based their administrative needs.356
C. Establishing a Global De Minimis Amount
The broad discretion afforded to States in setting market thresholds should
not be unlimited, however. This Article recommends that market thresholds be
subject to a global de minimis amount established on an OECD level. The global
de minimis amount would effectively serve as a small-seller exemption from the
new nexus.
The OECD’s Pillar One, akin to many DSTs, suggests a €750 million
global revenue threshold that leaves most businesses unaffected, including small
sellers. Note that both Pillar One and DSTs are not designed to specifically
protect small sellers; companies earning revenues in the hundreds of millions are
exempt from tax liability yet cannot be reasonably considered “small.”
Nevertheless, small businesses may face exposure to tax liability if global
revenue thresholds are wholly eliminated. A global de minimis amount for
market thresholds would function as a small seller exemption to protect smaller
companies. For example, assume that the market revenue threshold for Country
S is €2,000, unilaterally determined by Country S. Assume further that
SmallCorp, a U.S.-based start-up company without a physical presence in
Country S, reports €20,000 in revenues for the relevant financial year.
SmallCorp’s revenues in Country S are only €2,100. Without a global revenue
threshold, SmallCorp would be liable to pay the new tax, even though its
revenues in Country S are only €2,100. This would be an unreasonable result that
does not indicate a sustained and significant involvement in any economy, and
would also create undesirable compliance costs for smaller companies. This
problem can be resolved by instituting a global de minimis amount on market
thresholds. The de minimis amount would function as a limit on the unilateral
discretion of tax administrations; preventing arbitrary and excessive taxation of
small sellers.357 This means that the country-by-country threshold determination
356. Especially during the COVID-19 crisis.
357. OECD, supra note 94, at 8.
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will be subject to a predetermined de minimis amount.358 The de minimis would
be a minimum amount, agreed upon at the OECD level. Countries would be
permitted to exceed but not fall below the amount when setting their thresholds.
In addition, to eliminate a cliff effect for market thresholds, MNEs ought
to be taxable for every dollar359 above the market threshold rather than the entire
amount once the threshold is met, a common practice in income tax design.
Consider that market threshold of DST regimes can incorporate a cliff effect,
because taxable enterprises are often fully taxable on all revenue if the market
threshold has been satisfied (e.g. €25 million) and not liable at all if falling just
short.360 An ideal market threshold regime would tax every dollar above the
threshold—similar to income tax brackets—thereby eliminating the cliff effect.
Under such a system, taxpayers exceeding the threshold are not worse off than
those falling just short of it, and vertical equity remains observed. Assume, for
example, that the global de minimis amount for market revenue is $100,000, and
that Country T adopts the de minimis amount as its market threshold. QCorp, a
foreign enterprise, earns $105,000 of revenue in Country T, and does not have
physical presence in that country. Under the proposal set forth in this section,
QCorp would not be taxable on its first $100,000 of revenue in Country T and
would be taxable for every dollar above $100,000. A de minimis threshold would
therefore work as a small-seller exception and would tax prevent tax authorities
from targeting companies that are not profitable in market jurisdictions, such as
smaller start-up companies.
This proposal attributes taxing rights to the market jurisdiction by applying
the Pillar One taxing right based on market thresholds, subject to a global de
minimis amount. The proposal also reduces profit shifting opportunities, because
a tax nexus would be established in market jurisdictions irrespective of physical
presence. MNEs substantially engaging in economic activity in the market would
be caught by the new taxing right, while the market thresholds would be
determined by independent administrations. As a result, profits of MNEs would
be attributed, with more accuracy, to the jurisdiction in which they were earned.
Moreover, eliminating the global revenue threshold as well as unwanted cliff
effects greatly reduces tax planning opportunities. Avoiding the new taxing right
by dodging a threshold or distorting income would be far more difficult.
Admittedly, implementing this approach on an OECD level may be
358. The de minimis threshold amount may bear resemblance to VAT registration exemptions
provided in OECD countries. The higher-end exemption thresholds implemented by the U.K. (£85,000;
approximately $117,000), Japan (¥10 million; approximately $96,000) and Switzerland (CHf 100,000;
approximately $113,000) can serve as a reference for the possible deminimis amount. If the OECDdesires
to limit compliance costs and administrative burdens, this number could also bemuch higher. In any event,
it ought to be determined without discrimination. See VAT registration: When to register, HMRC,
https://www.gov.uk/vat-registration/when-to-register; Section 3. Taxes in Japan 3.6 Overview of
consumption tax, JAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE ORGANIZATION https://www.jetro.go.jp/en/invest/setting_up/
section3/page6.html; Foreign Companies, SWITZERLAND FEDERAL TAX ADMINISTRATION, https://www.
estv.admin.ch/estv/en/home/mehrwertsteuer/fachinformationen/steuerpflicht/leistungen-durch-auslaend
ische-unternehmen.html. A de minimis amount could also be adjusted for economy size (e.g. GDP),
although such a threshold will require an internationally agreed-upon metric and constant calibrations.
359. Or other applicable currency.
360. Note that this is not the case with the U.K. DST, where £25 million is deducted before the
2% tax is applied. See HMRC Digital Services Tax, supra note 206.
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challenging because it requires further substantial negotiation within the
Inclusive Framework, and eliminates the targeting of U.S.-based companies.
Digital tax measures, both unilateral and multilateral, are often popular precisely
because they target the revenues of large U.S.-based companies. Some OECD
countries may be reluctant to support an approach with a broad tax base until and
unless the U.S. supports international tax reform in general. This proposal serves
as a suggested compromise between the U.S. and other OECD Members. The
proposal would equitably allocate taxing rights to market jurisdictions while
reducing the tax gap between digital and non-digital companies without
discrimination.
IX. CONCLUSION
This Article examined the tax challenges arising from digitalization and the
leading approaches that aim to reform the international tax framework. It
evaluated the OECD’s Pillar One against unilateral DSTs and analyzed the
obstacles to achieving a global consensus-based solution. It argued that
international tax reform ought to be implemented through a multilateral approach
and asserted that unilateral measures will leave the international tax framework
in disarray. Furthermore, it recommended a multilateral solution without global
revenue thresholds that explicitly target U.S.-based companies. The Article
proposed applying the new tax nexus through market thresholds and subject to a
global de minimis amount.
These are critical times in which governments are engaging in growing tax
wars over revenue sources.361 The OECD has been slow to adapt the
international tax system to the digital era, thereby prompting unilateral action by
discontented tax administrations. The OECD faces a great challenge of achieving
a consensus-based solution within an Inclusive Framework numbering 137
Member States. This challenge is profoundly exacerbated by the COVID-19
pandemic in which economies are suffering, the need for tax revenue is
immediate, and unilateral measures are highly appealing. A timely consensus-
based solution is imperative and must address both the U.S.’ concerns and the
prevalence of unilateral regimes already in force.
361. See Arthur J. Cockfield, Tax Wars: The Battle Over Taxing Global Digital Commerce, 161
, Mason & Parada, supra note 241.
